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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Two things are central to the study of economic geography. For one, there are the costsof covering some geographical distance in order to exchange information, ideas, services orphysical goods. These costs inform many of our everyday decisions and actions, and theyconstitute the very reason for why geography is of any relevance in economics. Also, andpartly as a consequence thereof, there are the various sources of the centripetal forces,e.g., economies of scale and spatial monopolies. They act toward spatial concentration and— as a matter of fact — are all market imperfections of some sort.1 They counteract thecentrifugal forces that result from the exogenous dispersion of resources, and all the forcesultimately even out to shape the spatial pattern of economic activity.2When a network infrastructure investment leads to a reduction in some of the costs ofcovering some distance in space, the centripetal and centrifugal forces are both weakened.While the impact on the latter is quite straightforward, it is to be stated again that the costreduction works through imperfect markets in weakening the former. So, when assessingthe economic impact of such an investment, it would seem natural not to outright disregardthese imperfections. Also, it would seem natural not to disregard that the spatial patternmight be altered as a consequence of the weakened spatial forces. The cost reductionmight motivate some agents to change their decisions about where to locate, which mightin turn exhibit some externality. Thus, when improving some network infrastructure, thereare different potential effects on society that go beyond the immediate benefits to the usersof the infrastructure, which are the so-called “wider impacts”.In general, such a network infrastructure could be that of a transport network, e.g., roads,railways or inland waterways. Yet, it could also be that of a telecommunication network,e.g., fiber optic cables, cell towers or satellites (Bröcker, 2013, 2012b, sec. 4.2, pp. 85–87).Just as with a reduction of informal barriers, the consideration of wider impacts is alsoapplicable to a reduction of formal barriers like import tariffs, industry standards, harbordues or road tolls, e.g., economic integration.
1 “Unvollkommene Märkte sind nicht störender Nebenaspekt der ökonomischen Geographie, sondern ihr Kern.”(Bröcker, 2012b, p. 93; Imperfect markets are no disruptive minor point of economic geography, but its core.)2 See Brakman et al. (2009, ch. 2, pp. 32–78), Bröcker (2012b) or Duranton (2008) on economic geography.
2 Chapter 1 Introduction
I choose to speak of a transport network, not just because it is convenient to think ofthe movement of physical goods rather than that of data or knowledge. More importantly,the externalities that exist in connection with transport have so far attracted considerableattention from scholars, planners and decision-makers. This is true of the technologicalexternalities like environmental effects, accident risk and congestion, which are immediateconsequences of transportation that cause an inefficient allocation of resources. Though, itis also true of the pecuniary externalities, i.e., the wider impacts, which are indirect conse-quences of a transport infrastructure investment that do not cause an inefficient allocationof resources. See Dodgson (1973, pp. 169-171) and Scitovsky (1954) for this distinction.What I contemplate are the market imperfections and externalities in the wider economy.In the hypothetical case that these do not exist, i.e., if competition is perfect and externalitiesare nonexistent, a reduction in transport costs — in its entirety — feeds through into thewider economy. Primarily, it precipitates reductions in the prices of the goods and servicesthat are produced using transportation as an input. Ultimately, it has effects on consumersthat are not additional to the benefits to transport users, but equally large manifestationsthereof (Dodgson, 1973). Regarding these effects on consumers as additional, even thoughthey are not, would mean to double count. Though, it is safe to assume that externalitiesdo exist and that competition is at least somewhat imperfect. So, when cost reductions feedthrough into the wider economy, they manifest themselves in effects on consumers that mightvery well not be of equal size to the transport user benefits. The difference between thetwo, i.e., the wider impacts, must be regarded as additional to the transport user benefits.Acknowledging that wider impacts do exist prompts two questions. First, what is their sign?Second, what is their scale, and does it justify their assessment?In practice, different types of wider impacts are often claimed to be both positive and ofa considerable scale, and are thus taken as justification for transport projects. Given whatstates spend on their transport infrastructure, it is obvious that such wider impacts, if relevantat all, could easily be of some significance in absolute terms. According to the OECD’sInternational Transport Forum, ten member states of the EU15 spent between 0.6% and 1%of their respective gross domestic products on transport infrastructure investments duringthe year of 2014, as did many other industrialized countries.3,4 In the case of Germany,this was €17.1bn, which was 0.6% of GDP. In the case of France, this was €20.5bn, whichwas 1% of GDP. The investments comprise the construction of new infrastructure as well asthe improvement of existing infrastructure, though not its maintenance (OECD, 2016).
3 Those ten European countries are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands,Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the countries that have joined the European Union since 2004,the numbers are between 0.7% and 1.4% of GDP, except for the 2.1% in the case of Romania. Data on Maltaand Cyprus are not available.4 The other industrialized countries include Canada, Israel, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland,Turkey and the United States.
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The terminology is such that the transport user benefits are sometimes referred to as the“direct impacts”, which are the conventional measure of an investment’s welfare effect, albeitthat they might be passed on into the wider economy, at least in part. The “overall impacts”,on the other hand, are all the impacts that result from the transport cost reduction beingpassed through into the wider economy — without any double counting, of course — andultimately affecting social welfare, i.e., the welfare of not just the users of the infrastructure,but all households. The wider impacts are the difference between the overall impacts andthe direct impacts. I.e., they measure by how much the conventional transport appraisalunderestimates the actual impact on society. The wider impacts are also referred to in theliterature as “wider economic benefits (WEBs)”, yet this seems to be somewhat dated. Igenerally avoid to speak of wider benefits, so not to imply a positive sign. This is because,firstly, determining this sign is the actual aim of my resarch, and secondly, presupposing apositive sign — or even any sign — disagrees with my findings.The models that I develop are all purely theoretical spatial models in which the costs oftransportation are brought down through either state intervention or an exogenous shock.Including when I apply marginal analysis, I essentially evaluate the cost reduction’s welfareeffect by means of comparative statics, as is common practice in infrastructure appraisal(Mackie et al., 2011, p. 501). While the research on wider impacts has heavily relied onpartial equilibrium analysis, I employ only general equilibrium frameworks. This incorpo-rates the interactions between industries and/or regions so that it allows for a more accurateestimation of a transport scheme’s net wider impact; see Vickerman (2009, sec. 5, pp. 54–56),Newbery (2002, sec. 1, pp. 1–3), Mas-Colell et al. (1995, sec. 15.E, pp. 538–540), Bröcker& Mercenier (2011), and Kanemoto & Mera (1985). Wider impacts might appear to be self-contained and thus additional to the direct impacts. Yet, especially in developed regions,they might be redistributive impacts, and this can be assessed by the use of general equi-librium frameworks. A transport scheme’s costs are the costs of employing the necessarylabor, which is supplied by the households. In turn, the households pay a tax to finance thescheme. The net overall impact is measured as the impact on either the one representativehousehold’s or the multiple but identical households’ welfare, where the overall impacts areultimately conflated. There is no danger of double counting.The main sources of wider impacts that are supposedly existent and relevant are changesin the outputs on imperfectly competitive markets, i.e., on markets where the prices do notequal the marginal social costs, changes in the economic geography, i.e., agglomeration,and imperfections of the labor market like, say, an income tax. See the guidelines by theUnited Kingdom’s Department for Transport (DfT, 2014, sec. 2.2, pp. 2–3) for descriptionsof these three types of wider impacts. See also Mackie et al. (2011, p. 513 et seqq.) andHolvad & Leleur (2015, sec. 2, pp. 260–265). I disregard the imperfections of labor markets(Venables, 2007; Zhu et al., 2009). Instead, I investigate the roles of imperfect competitionand agglomeration, yet in separate classes of models.
4 Chapter 1 Introduction
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the relevant literature.The subsequent main body is divided into two parts, both of which start with a descriptionof the methodology applied to model transportation and the possible infrastructure project,and a description of the methodology applied to assess the wider impact. Part I deals withimperfect competition. It starts with a broad model in chapter 3, followed by models in thethree subsequent chapters that are more specific with regards to market structure. Part IIdeals with agglomeration. The model is introduced in chapter 7, and the two subsequentchapters consider one distinct case each. Chapter 10 concludes both parts of this thesis.Appendix A and appendix B belong to part I and part II, respectively, and they mostlyappend technical details, including the notation.The notation that I use differs between the two parts, but is consistent within them. Allthe notation is listed in appendix A.1 and appendix B.1 for part I and part II, respectively.Variables and parameters are only explained where they are first introduced, and not withthe model of every chapter. Differences in the use of subscripts and superscripts in thechapters of part I result from adaptations to the respective models at hand.When there is a reference in the margin next to the heading of a part, chapter or section,it is to the corresponding place within the main body. In the case of a heading within themain body itself, it is to the corresponding place within the appendices.
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Literature
Some of the earliest works on the economic appraisal of transport infrastructure projectsare by Tinbergen (1957) and by Bos & Koyck (1961). They develop examples of roadconstruction projects and subject them to comparative–static assessments of their impactson the national product. Yet, there are disadvantages to this method, as stated by Dodgson(1973, pp. 180–181), and it has not received as much attention as the conventional appraisalmethod based on the consumer surplus on the market for transportation (Bos & Koyck, 1961,pp. 19–20). Neither have other alternative methods. See Mohring (1976, ch. 9, pp. 105–113)for a comparison of these two methods.The conventional method combines the decrease in transportation costs, which mostlyresults from time savings and lower vehicle operating costs, with the traffic volumes beforeand after the investment to evaluate its social benefits. These are then offset against itssocial costs. Some of the earliest such cost–benefit analyses (CBAs) of transport projectsat the time were undertaken in the United Kingdom by Coburn et al. (1960) in the case ofa motorway between London and Birmingham, and by Foster & Beesley (1963) as well asBeesley & Foster (1965) in the case of the Victoria Line, an underground railway in London.These applications to transport are based on the prior literature on government efficiencyand welfare economics, e.g., Pigou (1920), as well as on research by engineers, like similarapplications in fields such as water resource management.The social benefits mentioned above, to be more precise, are the transport users’ benefitsfrom the transport cost reduction for the existing traffic and from the creation of additionaltraffic, i.e., the transport users’ gains in consumer surplus. When calculating these benefitsfor a given link, this is typically done by multiplying the change in the unit cost of trans-portation by the average of the traffic volumes before and after the investment, which is anaccurate measure of the change in the consumer surplus given a linear demand curve thatdoes not shift due to the investment. This is the so-called “rule of a half”, which was sug-gested by Neuburger (1971), though he was certainly not the first to mention or even usewhat is essentially this rule (Bos & Koyck, 1961, pp. 19–20). If demand is either nonlinear,shifted or simply unknown, or if the creation of traffic is moderate, the rule of a half is oftentaken to be a sufficient approximation (Small & Verhoef, 2007, p. 183).
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The gray area in figure 2.1 delineates the change in consumer surplus as given by therule of a half. Besides the one black, linear demand curve, there is a gray, strictly convexdemand curve to exemplify a situation in which the effective gain in consumer surplus isoverestimated by the rule of a half. See section 3.3.2 for an application of this rule.
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Figure 2.1 Transport user benefits and the rule of a half
The question of whether the benefits to transport users in any way reflect a transportinfrastructure investment’s effect on the welfare of society, is of course a fundamental one,and it has attracted considerable attention. Dodgson (1973) demonstrates that if there isperfect competition throughout the wider economy, and if externalities are absent, i.e., if allprices are equal to marginal social costs, this question can be answered in the affirmative.The transport user benefits are then a perfect reflection, and wider impacts do not exist.Mohring (1976, ch. 8, pp. 85–104) comes to the same conclusion using a more generalframework in which demand is not necessarily linear, not applying the rule of a half.Cost–benefit analysis still relies heavily on the estimation of transport user benefits. Yet,as it is acknowledged by Vickerman (2007a,b) as well as Small & Verhoef (2007, sec. 5.2, pp.181–190) in their descriptions of the modern practice, an assumption of perfect competitionmight be the source of a considerable bias. Mackie & Nellthorp (2009) oppose this notion,at least for developed regions, and suppose little additionality of the wider impacts.5There are various sources that serve as an introduction to the issue of wider impacts.Vickerman (2009), for instance, gives an introduction into the role of an economy’s transportsystem with a focus on its desired efficiency/optimality. Vickerman (2008a) gives some the-oretical as well as empirical background, and Vickerman (2008b) integrates the viewpointsof transport economics and urban economics. Laird et al. (2005) consider the network effects
5 See Small & Verhoef (2007, sec. 5.2.5, pp. 187–189), Mackie & Nellthorp (2009, sec. 4.2, pp. 166–169) andVickerman (2007a, sec. 3, pp. 602–604) for the descriptions of the wider impacts. See Iacono & Levinson(2015) for another review of the current practice.
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of transportation, a broader concept that includes impacts on the wider economy as wellas the redistribution and creation of traffic, among other things. Mackie et al. (2011) aswell as Holvad & Leleur (2015) give reviews of the (empirical) research on wider impactsin which they discuss the issue of additionality.The European Commission’s guidelines for the economic appraisal of investment projectssuggest to exclude wider impacts because they are mostly redistributive effects, and becausedouble counting should be avoided (EC, 2014, p. 25). Many countries do in fact exclude them(Mackie & Worsley, 2013). The United Kingdom, though, is an exception, and there has beenquite some research on this issue during the past couple of decades. Venables & Gasiorek(1999) wrote a well-know and influential report to the Standing Advisory Committee onTrunk Road Assessment (SACTRA) with a number of numerical examples of a computablegeneral equilibrium model, kicking off the development of appraisal techniques. The mostrecent version of the guidelines by the UK’s Department for Transport (DfT, 2018a) followthat development which is documented in the report by Eddington (2006) as well as inother publications by the DfT (2005, 2008, 2012a,b, 2014).6 A detailed overview of thedevelopment of guidelines for cost–benefit analysis in the UK is that by Worsley (2011,sec. 5, pp. 12–20).There are currently three major transport projects in the UK for which an assessment ofthe wider impacts has been carried out. There is Crossrail, which is an urban railway lineacross London. Its construction project, which is one of Europe’s largest, is currently underway and is planned to be complete by the end of 2019. According to Crossrail et al. (2011,pp. 9–12), this project will deliver wider impacts on welfare of between £6bn and £18bn,while costs are £5.6bn and direct impacts are between £11bn and £15.5bn. These arepresent values in 2002 prices. The wider impacts from imperfect competition have a valueof £485m, which is less than a tenth of the impacts from agglomeration and 1–2 percent ofthe total overall impacts (Colin Buchanan, 2007, p. 21 et seqq.).7,8 Worsley (2011, sec. 6,pp. 20–25) gives an overview of attempted quantifications of the wider impacts of Crossrailand some historical background.Another project in the UK is HS2, a Y-shaped high-speed railway between London and anumber of cities in central and northern England. Construction is planned to take till 2033.This transport scheme is expected to increase Britain’s annual GDP by some £15bn in 2037(in 2013 prices). This is the total productivity impact which consists of seven region–specificimpacts that are all alleged to be positive, with either of two scenarios regarding the impacton business location (HS2, 2013a,b).9
6 For further documentation by the DfT, see https://www.gov.uk/guidance/transport-analysis-guidance-webtag(latest access: 2018-06-07).7 See http://www.crossrail.co.uk/route/wider-economic-benefits (latest access: 2018-06-07).8 See also Colin Buchanan (2007, ch. 5) for more details than in the summary report. See Jenkins et al. (2011,p. 104 et seq.) for a brief overview of the estimated impacts.9 See https://www.hs2.org.uk (latest access: 2018-05-25).
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The third project is an aviation project. There are three different schemes proposing toincrease the capacity of the airport at either Gatwick or Heathrow. The main report by theAirports Commission (AC, 2015a,b) states that the agglomeration benefits with Heathrow aremuch larger than with Gatwick due to already existing business clusters. Also, Heathrowhas an advantage in terms of the additional tax revenues created through the movementto more productive jobs. In total, the wider impacts amount to £11.5bn in the case ofan expansion of the northwestern runway at Heathrow Airport. The estimates for the twoalternative schemes are £10bn for the westerly extension of the runway at Heathrow Airportand £8.1bn for the new runway at Gatwick Airport. These are present values in 2014 prices.
2.1 Imperfect competitionI
If a market in the wider economy is imperfectly competitive, the marginal willingness to payof the consumers, i.e., the price, exceeds the marginal cost. This positive mark-up indicatesthat an increase in the quantity would give rise to a wider imipact beyond the gain in theconsumer and producer surpluses on the transport market (DfT, 2018b, sec. 4, pp. 16–18).See also Mackie et al. (2011, p. 520), Jara-Díaz (1986) and Bröcker (1998, 2001).If a transport investment makes the competition of a market become less imperfect, thismight give rise to a wider impact. For instance, spatial monopolies exist because sufficientlyhigh transport costs shield them from competition. When this shield is partly removed, otherfirms might enter the market, thereby altering its structure. See Vickerman (2009, p. 56)and DfT (2005, sec. 3.2, pp. 23–25).The guidance by the DfT (2018b, sec. 4.3, pp. 17–18) suggests the simplified approachof adding a fixed share of 10% to the total business and freight user benefits. This estimateis the result of research into mark-ups and elasticities (DfT, 2005).
2.2 AgglomerationII
Economic agents base their decisions about where to locate on various criteria that areinformed by the costs of transportation to and from each possible location. For an individual,these can be the costs of commuting to their place of work. For a firm, these can be thecosts of transporting its produce to customers. When a transport infrastructure investmentreduces these costs, it might have an impact on the agents’ choice of location. While thischoice is made as to optimize the agent’s own welfare, it might also impact that of others.Hence, there is an externality. Yet, since this externality is external to the market, it doesnot cause an inefficient allocation of resources. If agents do not relocate as a result of atransport scheme, there is no wider impact, as demonstrated by Newbery (2002). Though,if agents do relocate, a wider impact might exist.
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A positive wider impact from agglomeration is typically attributed to a net benefit froman increase in agglomeration at large. Agglomeration economies are in turn attributed toincreases in productivity due to, say, an improved division of labor or knowledge spill-overs(Gibbons & Overman, 2009; Graham, 2005a,b, 2006, 2007a,b; Graham et al., 2009, 2010;Graham & van Dender, 2011). An increase in the agglomeration within, for instance, a cityis due to an increase in either the geographical concentration within the city, the size ofthe city or the effective density of the city. The latter is brought about by a reduction inthe costs of travel within the city, but not necessarily by the relocation of economic activity(DfT, 2018c). Comprehensive introductions to agglomeration economies are those by Eberts& McMillen (1999) and Rosenthal & Strange (2004). A review of work in the context oftransport is that by Jenkins et al. (2011).Venables (2007) develops a model in which the size of a monocentric city is increasedthrough a reduction in the costs of commuting to the central business district, and the pro-ductivity of labor in that city is assumed to be increasing in the city’s size. The productivityof labor in the periphery, though, is not affected by the expansion of the city. There is apositive wider impact because the shift of labor from the periphery to the city increases theproductivity of all the workers in the city; yet, it does not decrease anyone’s productivity.Meijers et al. (2012) investigate the distributive effects between center and periphery, witha real–life application to a tunnel that was constructed under the Westerschelde estuary.The model by Kanemoto (2013) is one with multiple cities, some of which might suffer awelfare loss as a consequence of a transportation improvement, while others enjoy a welfaregain. See also Krugman & Venables (1995). For the guidelines by the UK’s Departmentfor Transport on how to assess agglomeration’s productivity impacts, see DfT (2018c).The model that I develop in part II is a New Economic Geography (NEG) model thatis an adaptation of the center–periphery model by Krugman (1991).10 The adaptation ismade as to allow for an assessment of the wider impact. Other such assessments are thoseby Baldwin et al. (2003), Charlot et al. (2006), Helpman (1998), Ottaviano & Thisse (2001,2002), Robert-Nicoud (2006) and Tabuchi & Thisse (2002); see Pflüger & Südekum (2008b).The one by Pflüger (2004) builds on the model by Forslid (1999). In that, it is like theFootloose–Capital Model (Baldwin et al., 2003, ch. 3, pp. 68–90), but capital owners aremobile in the long run and there is no repatriation of incomes. Also, the upper–tier utilityfunction is quasi-linear rather than of the Cobb–Douglas type. The economy exhibits higherdegrees of concentration than what is socially desirable; so, the wider impact is negative..11
10 For a background on the New Economic Geography, see Schmutzler (1999), Fujita & Krugman (2004),Bröcker (2012a) and Ottaviano & Thisse (2004). For the role of transport costs, see Alonso Villar (2007)and Lafourcade & Thisse (2011).11 According to my supervisor, Johannes Bröcker, the sign of the wider impact is determined by introducing asocial planner. Prices are set equal to marginal costs, a lump-sum tax is levied to compensate the capitalowners (in terms of the numeraire good), and social welfare, which can simply be measured by summing upindividual welfare levels due to the quasi-linear utility function, is maximized.
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Pflüger & Südekum (2008b) develop an assessment based on that by Pflüger (2004)which also features over-agglomeration. They incorporate housing costs (Helpman, 1998)so that there is under-agglomeration and/or dispersion at low levels of the transport cost.Yet, the transition to agglomeration, which occurs at higher levels of the transport cost, isnot socially desirable, at least not to the extent that is yielded by the market.Ottaviano et al. (2002, sec. 5) set up another model with a quasi-linear utility function.There are zero marginal costs, the households have positive initial endowments with anumeraire good, and the transport costs are measured in units of that numeraire good. Asopposed to the two models mentioned above, there is a catastrophic rahter than smoothtransition from dispersion to concentration as a consequence of a transport cost reduction.At the transport cost threshold where the transition occurs, concentration yields a lowerwelfare level than dispersion. Hence, the wider impact is negative.Tabuchi (1998) comes to the opposite conclusion. In his model, agglomeration is usuallyfavorable compared to dispersion. So, he suggests to conduct policies that promote economicintegration if that leads to more agglomeration, since the wider impact is likely to be positive.
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Imperfect competition A
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This part investigates the sign of a transport cost reduction’s wider impact resulting fromimperfectly competitive industries in the wider economy. These industries are imperfectlycompetitive in that prices exceed marginal costs. When the transport cost reduction is fedthrough into the wider economy via the industries using the concerned means of transporta-tion, this might trigger indirect effects on other industries that do or do not use these meansof transportation. If any of these industries are imperfectly competitive, whether they areaffected directly or indirectly, what is ultimately passed on to consumers might deviate fromthe original cost reduction. See DfT (2018b, sec. 4, pp. 16–18) and Mackie et al. (2011,p. 520). So, there might be a wider impact on the welfare of consumers in addition to theoriginal cost reduction, and this wider impact might be either positive or negative. Whichsign it is, and what the determinants are of this sign, is investigated in the models of thefollowing chapters.
Transport costs and transport scheme
All the models developed through the course of not just this part, but the entire thesis,are built around the eventual necessity of having to overcome any spatial distance thatmight lie between economic agents whenever they engage in some sort of transaction. Thecorresponding costs that I consider are those of shipping at least one type of final goodfrom the producer to the consumer. This is to say that these are the costs that are reduced,whether it is through some costly transport scheme or through an exogenous shock that isfree of cost. I refer to either as a scheme. Other possible transport costs remain unaffected.
Transport costs
All marginal costs are constant in the quantities produced and/or transported. The marginalcost of production of firm j is denoted by the exogenous cj > 0. The marginal cost oftransportation unaffected by the scheme is denoted by τj ≥ 0, which is also exogenous.Prior to the scheme, the total marginal cost of transportation is τj + tj , where the exogenoustj ≥ 0 denotes the fraction of this cost that is eliminated through the scheme. I occasionallyamend the notation by a subscript other than j to distinguish between goods, firms, regionsor the like.
Transport scheme
The scheme’s progress is denoted by φ ∈ [0, 1], and tj identifies the effect of the full scheme.The total marginal cost of production and transportation combined is
mj := cj + τj + (1− φ) tj .
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This cost is modeled as linear in φ, i.e., dmj /dφ = −tj , so the reduction thereof, φtj , isproportional to that of any other firm’s cost. As the scheme progresses, it causes equablereductions of the costs of all the users of the concerned means of transportation.The way that the scheme works is that households give up part of their income in formof a lump-sum tax which is redistributed to fund reductions in the costs for transport users.Through the reduced costs, the firms using transportation are led to lower their prices andincrease their quantities, ceteris paribus, as partial equilibrium analysis suggests. Thoughin general equilibrium, if some quantities are increased, some quantities might be decreased,because the resources are limited.The effect on the economy’s production possibilities given the limited resources dependson how the cost reductions relate to the necessary costs of the scheme. If the scheme isfree of cost, the production possibilities are expanded and the quantities of the final goodsare increased at large. The higher the costs of the scheme are, the smaller are the changesin the quantities. If the costs of the scheme are equal to the aggregate cost reduction, e.g.,if the scheme is a subsidy, it does not alter the production possibilities as social costs donot change. The marginal social cost of firm j would be m˜j := mj ∣∣φ=0 while mj representsthe marginal private cost. The difference, φtj , would be the cost external to the firm. So,if the quantity of one good is increased, the additional labor must be withdrawn from theproduction of some other good, thus decreasing this good’s quantity.
Welfare assessment
I distinguish between the overall impact, I , the direct impact, D, and the wider impact, W .The overall impact is the impact on the households’ welfare measured as the compensatingvariation. It is the net effect because the scheme’s costs are taken into account by lettingthe households pay for them through the tax on their income. Therefore, I also calculatethe direct impact as the net effect. The gross direct impact is the welfare effect on transportusers measured as the change in the consumer surplus on the transport market, albeit — atleast to some extent — fed through into the wider economy. The net direct impact followsby subtraction of the scheme’s costs.The wider impact is the extent by how much the direct impact underestimates the overallimpact, i.e., the difference between the two. So, the scheme’s costs cancel themselves outwhen I and D are offset against one another. There is no distinction to make with regardsto the wider impact about whether I and D are inclusive of the scheme’s costs. The scheme’scosts only have an influence on the wider impact via their influence on the quantities of thevarious goods. In general equilibrium, the scheme absorbs some of the economy’s availableresources that would otherwise be employed in the production of these goods. The moreresources the scheme absorbs, the smaller is the change in the production at large whichfollows as a consequence of the scheme, and the smaller is the wider impact.
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Chapter 3
Base model A.2
Assume a spatial world with an exogenous number of goods and one household consumingthese goods. Each good is supplied by one industry, and one industry alone, which operatesunder either perfect or imperfect competition. The only factor of production that is employedby the industries is labor. The household supplies the labor fully inelastically. Moreover,labor is the numeraire. All industries’ profits are transferred to the household.When a transport scheme is conducted, reducing some of the costs of some of the indus-tries, these reductions are fed through into the wider economy and are ultimately conflatedinto an impact on the household’s welfare. Due to the imperfect competition in some indus-tries, this impact might include an either positive or negative wider impact in addition tothe original cost reduction.
3.1 Industries
Beside the degrees of competition, there is one other fundamental difference between theindustries, and this regards the degrees to which their costs are affected by the scheme.Firms of the same industry differ neither in regard to the transport cost nor in any otherregard. Every firm of industry i ∈ {1, . . . , N} has a marginal cost of production of ci > 0 ∀iand a marginal cost of transportation following the scheme of τi ≥ 0 ∀i. It has a totalmarginal cost prior to the scheme of m˜i := ci + τi + ti and experiences a cost reduction of
ti ≥ 0 ∀i with ti > 0 ∃i . (3.1a)
Hence, with φ ∈ [0, 1] as the scheme’s progress, the total marginal cost of industry i is
mi := ci + τi + (1− φ) ti . (3.1b)
The price of any good i, pi = mi + µi , (3.2)
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includes a mark-up atop the marginal cost of
µi := pi −mi ≥ 0 . (3.3a)
If industry i is perfectly competitive, its mark-up is zero, and positive otherwise. In relativeterms, the mark-up is νi := pimi ≥ 1 . (3.3b)The numbers of firms within the industries are assumed to be exogenous, and all firms ofan industry are identical. Amounts are simply stated as aggregate values. The aggregatefixed input of industry i is denoted by Fi ≥ 0 ∀i. The aggregate quantity is Xi, which isendogenous, so that the aggregate variable input is miXi. Since the inputs are labor only,and since the wage rate is one, the aggregate profit is
Πi := µiXi − Fi . (3.4)
3.2 General equilibrium
The household receives all industries’ profits plus its earned income. The earned incomeequals L, which is the household’s exogenous endowment with labor and the labor supply.The total labor demand comprises that by the industries and that by the scheme which is
S = S(φ) (3.5)
with S(0) = 0 and S′(φ) := dS(φ)/dφ ≥ 0. When the labor market clears, then
L =∑i (miXi + Fi) + S . (3.6)
The scheme is financed through a lump-sum tax that is imposed on the household. Therefore,the household’s nominal disposable income is
y := L+∑i Πi − S . (3.7)
With (3.6), (3.4) and (3.3a), this yields the household’s budget constraint:
y =∑i piXi . (3.8)
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3.3 Welfare
3.3.1 Overall impact
To assess the impact that the scheme has on the household’s utility level, which is denotedby u, I work out what the compensating variation (CV) is and how it relates to φ. The CVreflects the value that, if subtracted from the household’s income, would allow the householdto attain some reference utility level denoted by u¯. In other words, the CV is the differencebetween the income and the minimal expenditures necessary to attain u¯ at current prices.Other variables’ or parameters’ values in the reference situation are also denoted by a bar.With p := (p1, . . . , pN ), the indirect utility function, v (p, y), and the expenditure function,e(p, u), the definition of the overall impact, I , which is the CV, that I apply is
I := y− e(p, u¯) ⇔ v (p, y− I) = u¯ .12 (3.9)
When evaluating the marginal impact of a (further) increase in φ, the point of reference isjust the point of evaluation, i.e., φ¯ = φ. With examples of discrete increases in φ, the pointof reference is φ¯ = 0. While I|φ¯=φ ≡ 0, the impact can have either sign as the result of anincrease in φ. A positive I indicates a welfare gain as, even if the household were to giveup some of its income, it would still be able to attain u¯. A negative I indicates a welfareloss as, if the household were to be enabled to attain u¯, it would need to be compensatedfor the changes triggered by the scheme.Differentiating I (3.9) with respect to φ yields
I ′ := dIdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ = dydφ −∑i Xi dpidφ (3.10a)
by applying Shephard’s lemma (Jehle & Reny, 2011, p. 37 et seqq.). The total differentialof the budget constraint (3.8) is
dy =∑i pi dXi +
∑
i Xi dpi . (3.11)
The Marshallian demand functions, Xi = Xi(p, y), yield the changes in the quantities as
X ′i := dXidφ =∑j ∂Xi∂pj dpjdφ + ∂Xi∂y dydφ . (3.12)
12 I apply the definition of the compensating variation (CV) by Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 82 et seqq.), Varian(1992, sec. 10.1, pp. 160–163) or Boadway & Bruce (1984, sec. 7.3, pp. 201–205), which is equivalent to thatby Jehle & Reny (2011, p. 180 et seqq.) — except for the reversed sign.
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The changes in the prices (3.1b–2) are
dpidφ = dµidφ − ti . (3.13)
The changes in the mark-ups are discussed starting in section 3.3.4. Inserting (3.11) into(3.10a) yields I ′ =∑i piX ′i . (3.10b)From the labor market’s equilibrium condition (3.6) follows
dL =∑i mi dXi −
(∑
i tiXi − S′(φ)
) dφ = 0 . (3.14)
Subtracting (3.14) from (3.10b) yields
I ′ =∑i µiX ′i +
∑
i tiXi − S′(φ) . (3.10c)
3.3.2 Direct impactA.2.1
The discrete change in the costs of the scheme (3.5) is
∆S := S(φ)− S(φ¯) . (3.15)
Since the direct impact is measured as the change in the consumer surplus on the transportmarket, the gross and the net direct impact, respectively, with p = p(φ) and y = y(φ), are
∆CS := ∫ φφ¯
(∑
i ti Xi(p(φ), y(φ))
) dφ (3.16a)
D := ∆CS − ∆S . (3.16b)
These are zero at the point of reference, i.e., D|φ¯=φ ≡ 0. Generally, the integration alongthe Marshallian demand functions is path-dependent (Johansson, 1991, sec. 4.2, pp. 42–47).Here, the path of integration arises out of the assumption of marginal costs being linear in φ.If one would use the Hicksian demand functions instead, thus calculating the compensatingor equivalent variation rahter than the change in consumer surplus, the direct impact wouldnot be path-dependent (Johansson, 1991, sec. 4.4, pp. 49–52). See also Boadway & Bruce(1984, p. 198 et seqq.).The derivative of D (3.15–16) with respect to φ, by use of (3.14), is
D′ := dDdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ =∑i tiXi − S′(φ) =
∑
i miX ′i . (3.17)
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The same holds true if, instead of the change in consumer surplus, either the compensatingor the equivalent variation is used in determining this marginal impact.Using the rule of a half (Button, 2009, sec. 6, pp. 71–73) to approximate the change inconsumer surplus (3.16a) gives
∆CS = (φ − φ¯)∑i ti Xi + X¯i2 . (3.18)
At φ¯ = φ and X¯i = Xi ∀i, D′ (3.17) again follows as the marginal net direct impact; seeappendix A.2.1.
3.3.3 Wider impact A.2.2
Since the wider impact is the extent by how much the direct impact underestimates theoverall impact, (3.9) and (3.16b) yield
W := I −D =∑i
(Πi − Π¯i)− (e(p, u¯)− e(p¯, u¯))− ∆CS . (3.19)
See appendix A.2.2. At the point of reference, the wider impact is zero, i.e., W |φ¯=φ ≡ 0.The derivative of W (3.19) with respect to φ is the marginal wider impact and follows asthe difference between either of (3.10b–c) and (3.17):
W ′ := dWdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ = I ′ −D′ =∑i µiX ′i . (3.20a)
Figure 3.1 illustrates the impacts from a single industry with ti > 0, a constant µi > 0,dXi > 0 and a linear demand curve, and for a discrete increase in φ. These impacts aredenoted by Ii, Di and Wi, with W = ∑iWi etc.; cf. Mackie et al. (2011, Figure 21.3b,p. 521). The scheme’s costs attributed to industry i are ∆Si := m¯iX¯i − miXi. This is theamount of labor withdrawn from industry i, and ∆S = ∑i ∆Si; see (3.6). Subtracting ∆Sifrom both the gross overall impact and the gross direct impact yields the respective netimpacts, Ii and Di, as delineated in figure 3.1.The marginal wider impact exhibits a positive sign if activity is shifted toward industrieswith positive mark-ups and, if at all, away from industries with relatively low or evenzero mark-ups. The distribution of the quantity shifts (3.12) depends on the price changes(3.13), which in turn depend on the cost reductions as well as the changes in the mark-ups.Also, the change in any normal good’s quantity is the larger, the larger the change in thehousehold’s disposable income (3.7) is. Hence, the change in the production at large, andthus the marginal wider impact, is the larger, the lower the scheme’s additional costs are.
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Figure 3.1 Welfare effect on the industry level (ti > 0, µi > 0, dµi = 0, dXi > 0, φ¯ = 0)
The mark-up, µi, quantifies the wider impact from an additional unit of good i in terms ofthe additional surplus as it is the difference between the household’s marginal willingnessto pay and the marginal cost. It is also the profit contribution of an additional unit since∂Πi/∂Xi = µi; see (3.4). From (3.19) with (3.13) and (3.16a) follows
W ′ =∑i dΠidφ −
∑
i Xi dµidφ . (3.20b)
Generally, the wider impact is channeled into the household’s welfare via the changes in theprofits and the mark-ups. The particular case of constant mark-ups follows in section 3.3.4,and that of constant profits follows in section 3.3.5.
3.3.4 Exogenous mark-ups
If the mark-ups are exogenous, the cost reductions translate into equally large price reduc-tions as dµi = 0 ⇒ dpi/dφ = −ti; see (3.13). Also, the changes in profits are only due tochanges in the quantities as dΠi = µi dXi, but not to changes in the mark-ups; see (3.4).It follows from (3.20a–b) that the marginal wider impact equals the marginal impact on theaggregate profit: dµi = 0 ∀i⇒ W ′ =∑i dΠi/dφ.
3.3.5 Zero profitsA.2.3
For the purpose of this section, the mark-ups are endogenous. Presupposing that zero profitsprevail, firms charge prices equal to average costs: pi = ai := mi + Fi/Xi ⇒ µi = Fi/Xi;see (3.4). Thus, dµi/µidφ = −X ′iXi ; (3.21)
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see (3.13). From either (3.20a) with (3.21) for all N industries, or (3.20b) with dΠi = 0 ∀i,follows W ′ = −∑i Xi dµidφ = −
∑
i Xi ∂ai∂Xi X ′i . (3.20c)Whether the marginal wider impact is positive, is a question of whether the quantity shiftsbring down average costs at large. If they do, they bring down the mark-ups with them asthey draw prices nearer to marginal costs. Since ∂ai/∂Xi = dµi/dXi = −Fi/Xi2 ≤ 0 ∀i,the average costs of any industry are only brought down if this industry exhibits economiesof scale due to positive fixed costs and an increase in its quantity. If economic activityis shifted toward industries with economies of scale and, if at all, away from industrieswith relatively weak or even zero economies of scale, both average costs and mark-ups arebrought down at large and the marginal wider impact is positive.With a price equal to average costs, the elasticity of the average costs with regard to thequantity is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of the quantity with regard to the price.This inverse in turn gives the mark-up as a fraction of the price:
εi := − ∂ ln(Xi)∂ ln(pi) (3.22a)⇒ 1εi = − ∂ ln(ai)∂ ln(Xi) = µipi . (3.22b)
The elasticity is assumed to be greater than one, so the output is increasing in the input.The inverse elasticity (3.22b) with the mark-up (3.3a) yields
µi = 1εi − 1 mi (3.23a)pi = εiεi − 1 mi . (3.23b)The higher the elasticity of the average costs (3.22b) is, the higher is the mark-up (3.23a).With zero profits, demand still needs to be shifted toward the industries with the relativelyhigh mark-ups for the marginal wider impact to be positive. But now this is not becausethese industries are the ones with strong increases in their profits but with strong economiesof scale and strong decreases in their mark-ups. The mark-up of good i is decreased if andonly if (dεi/εi)/dφ > −ti/pi; see appendix A.2.3.Chapter 4 presents a fully specified model with free entry and exit of firms, and thus zeroprofits and endogenous mark-ups, though with constant scale elasticities instead of linearcost functions. It elaborates on the relevance and interrelation of the economies of scale,the mark-ups, the elasticities, the quantity shifts and the transport costs.
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3.3.6 Monopolies
If all N industries are monopolies, the mark-ups and the prices are as given by (3.23). Theprice elasticities of demand are as given by (3.22a); though, (3.22b) does not apply, exceptthat µi = pi/εi ∀i. The elasticities are assumed to be greater than one, so a solution to afirm’s profit maximization exists. See Jehle & Reny (2011, p. 170 et seqq.), Varian (1999,ch. 24, pp. 414–432) or Mas-Colell et al. (1995, sec. 12.B, pp. 384–387). As opposed tosection 3.3.5, the profits are not zero. Hence, the wider impact is channeled via changes inboth profits and mark-ups; (A.1) applies.
3.3.7 Zero direct impactA.2.4
With αi := piXi/y as the expenditure share of good i, (3.20a) is
W ′ = [∑i αi µipi X
′iXi
]y .13 (3.22c)
Assume that S′(φ) = ∑i tiXi, so there is no marginal direct impact (3.17) as the marginalcosts of the scheme equal the marginal cost reduction for the current transport volume.14Due to the limitation regarding the available resources (3.14), (3.22c) is
W ′ = [∑i αi X
′iXi
]y ; (3.22d)
see appendix A.2.4. The marginal wider impact is positive if the relative quantity shifts arepositive on average when weighted by the expenditure shares.Since D′ = 0, it follows that W ′ = I ′; see (3.20a). The price–to–marginal–cost ratios(3.3b) with W ′ (3.20a), (3.3a) and (3.14), cf. I ′ (3.10b–c), yield
W ′ =∑i νimiX ′i . (3.22e)
Since miX ′i is the change in industry i’s employment of labor, the wider impact is thesechanges’ sum weighted by the mark-ups, while ∑imiX ′i = 0; see (3.14). The impact ispositive if resources are shifted away from the industries with the low νi’s toward theindustries with the high νi’s. By use of an average mark-up, νˆ, and an average quantityshift, Xˆ ′, with νˆ :=∑i νi mi∑imi =
∑i pi∑imi and/or Xˆ ′ := 0 , (3.24)
13 In section 3.3.5 and section 3.3.6, µi/pi = 1/εi; see (3.22b) and/or (3.23).14 If the scheme is a subsidy, i.e., if S(φ) = φ∑i tiXi, then S ′(0) =∑i tiXi. Compare section 4.5.2.
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(3.22e) can be expressed as a correlation between mark-ups and resource shifts:
W ′ =∑i (νi − νˆ)mi
(X ′i − Xˆ ′) . (3.22f)
For uniform mark-up factors, i.e., νi = ν ∀i, (3.22e–f) with (3.14) and (3.24) yield W ′ = 0.There is no marginal welfare gain or loss, and thus no marginal wider impact, becausethe relative prices equal the relative marginal costs: pi/pj = (νmi) / (νmj) = mi/mj ∀i, j .Hence, the allocation of resources is socially optimal, even if the industries are imperfectlycompetitive in that ν > 1.
3.4 Two–industry economy
In the case of a two–industry economy with imperfect competition in industry 1 and perfectcompetition in industry 2, i.e., µ1 > 0 and µ2 = 0, the necessary and sufficient condition forthe marginal wider impact (3.20a) to be positive is X ′1 > 0, irrespective of X ′2. If and only ifeconomic activity is shifted toward the imperfectly competitive industry, the scheme has apositive marginal wider impact.Assume that only the costs of industry 1 are affected by the scheme as t1 > 0 and t2 = 0.Hence, the price of good 2 does not change while the price of good 1 decreases, assumingthat the change in its mark-up is smaller than the decrease in the marginal cost; see (3.13).If demand for good 1 is decreasing in its own price, i.e., ∂X1/∂p1 < 0, and independent ofincome, i.e., ∂X1/∂y = 0, then (3.12) yields that demand for good 1 does increase. Industry 1is the only industry that benefits from the scheme so that its relative price decreases, shiftingdemand toward industry 1 and giving rise to a positive wider impact. Starting in chapter 5,I present models with two industries of such sort where I investigate the role of the marketstructure of the industry with imperfect competition.
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Chapter 4
Monopolistic competition A.3
The following model is a fully specified example. It builds on section 3.3.5 which considerszero profits within the previous framework. There is a spatial world with a single householdconsuming N heterogeneous goods. Each of the goods is produced by one industry, and oneindustry alone. All of these industries operate under monopolistic competition as developedby Dixit & Stiglitz (1977); see Fujita et al. (1999, ch. 4, pp. 45–59). Labor is the only factorof production as well as the numeraire. The household supplies it fully inelastically to theindustries and the transport scheme.Every firm of industry i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is the sole supplier of one of ni varieties of good i,which are heterogeneous to the household. Every variety’s production features economies ofscale due to fixed costs and a constant marginal cost. Hence, the prices include mark-ups.The relative mark-ups atop the total marginal costs are constant because demand for anysingle variety is isoelastic; so, the absolute mark-ups are nonincreasing in the scheme’sprogress. Every good i is a composite of its varieties. The numbers of varieties/firms areendogenous as firms can freely enter and exit the markets; so, they all earn a zero profit.All firms of an industry are assumed to be identical, and since all varieties of a good enterthe household’s utility function in the same way, the firm–level parameters and variablesare uniform within the industries.
4.1 Household A.3.1
The household’s utility is given by the Cobb–Douglas function
u :=∏i Xiαi (4.1a)
with αi ∈ (0, 1) ∀i and ∑i αi = 1, so αi is the income share spent on good i. Of everygood i there are ni varieties, and xi units are consumed per variety. Each Xi is the quantityof the composite of the ni varieties’ quantities and given by a CES sub–utility function (A.2)
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with σi > 1 ∀i as the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties:
Xi = Ui(xi) = ni σiσi−1 xi . (4.1b)
From the utility function (4.1a) and the budget constraint, y = ∑i PiXi, with Pi as theprice index of the composite i, follow the Marshallian demand functions
Xi = Xi(Pi, y) := αiyPi . (4.2a)The Marshallian demand functions for the single varieties of good i, whose price is denotedby pi, is xi = xi(pi, y) = pi−σiPiσi−1αiy . (4.2b)
Hence, σi is also the constant price elasticity of demand for any one variety of good i. Theprice index of good i is Pi = ni 11−σi pi . (4.3)
See appendix A.3.1 for the derivations (Fujita et al., 1999, sec. 4.1, pp. 46–49).
4.2 Industries
All firms of industry i are identical with regard to their cost structure. The fixed costsper firm are fi > 0 ∀i. The marginal costs of production and transportation (following thescheme) are ci > 0 ∀i and τi ≥ 0 ∀i, respectively. The cost reductions are ti ≥ 0 ∀i withti > 0 ∃i, and the progress of the scheme is φ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the total marginal cost ismi := ci + τi + (1− φ) ti. Prior to the scheme, this is m˜i := mi|φ=0. The mark-up of anyvariety of good i is denoted by µi := pi −mi. A firm’s profit is
pii := µixi − fi . (4.4)
Assuming a negligible effect of its single variety’s price on the composite’s price, a firmcharges a price of pi = σiσi − 1 mi , (4.5)including a mark-up of µi = 1σi − 1 mi > 0 , (4.6a)with dµi/dφ = −ti/ (σi − 1) ≤ 0. The relative mark-up is constant as
νi := pimi ≡ σiσi − 1 > 1 . (4.6b)
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4.3 Long-run equilibrium A.3.2
By solving the zero profit condition with (4.4) and (4.6a), I get the equilibrium quantity
xi = (σi − 1) fimi . (4.7a)This is nondecreasing in φ because, due to the constant relative mark-up, νi > 1 (4.6b), ifti is positive, the price decreases by more than the marginal cost (in absolute terms) whenφ is increased. I.e., the absolute mark-up (4.6a) decreases. This means that the firm needsto sell a larger quantity in order to cover its fixed costs, which is what it merely does givenfree entry. Due to economies of scale, a variety’s average costs are nonincreasing in φ.The consumer spends a fixed share of their income on good i as PiXi = αiy; see (4.2a).Besides, they purchase equally large amounts of the goods’ varieties. So, the equilibriumamount consumed per variety of good i is
xi = αiynipi , (4.7b)
as follows from (4.2b–3). Setting (4.7a) equal to (4.7b), and solving for ni by use of (4.5),gives ni = αiyσifi . (4.8)From (4.7a) follows that a firm’s total costs — and total revenues — are mixi + fi = σifi.Hence, ni (4.8) is industry i’s aggregate revenues divided by a single firm’s revenues. It isnonincreasing in φ because y is, since the costs of the scheme are nondecreasing in φ; seesection 4.4. Since the income is nonincreasing in φ, the expenditures on good i, PiXi = αiy,are so, too. Whether Pi and Xi are increasing or decreasing in φ, is ambiguous, unless yis constant or ti = 0; see (4.1b) and (4.3), respectively, and appendix A.3.2.
4.4 General equilibrium
There are no profits to be transferred to the household. Hence, the household’s nominaldisposable income is earned income, L, which is its exogenous endowment with labor, minusthe lump-sum tax, S = S(φ) , (4.9)
with S(0) = 0 and S′(φ) := dS(φ)/dφ ≥ 0. I.e.,
y := L− S ⇒ δ := yL = L− SL . (4.10)
So, δ ∈ (0, 1] with δ|φ=0 ≡ 1 is nonincreasing in φ.
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Transportation intensities are denoted by χi := ti/pi ≥ 0 ∀i. The average transportationintensity with the income shares for weights is
χˆ :=∑i αiχi > 0 , (4.11)
which is increasing in φ. With the numerical examples to follow, I distinguish between atransport scheme that is free of cost, i.e.,
S(φ) = 0 ⇒ δ ≡ 1 , (4.12a)
and a scheme that is a subsidy, i.e.,
S(φ) = φ∑i tinixi ⇒ δ = 11 + φχˆ .15 (4.12b)
Here, δ follows from substituting S(φ) (4.12) into (4.10), with xi (4.7b) if necessary. In thecase of the subsidy, δ is decreasing in φ.
4.5 WelfareA.3.3
4.5.1 Overall impactA.3.3.1
In order to construct a welfare measure in the way described in section 3.3.1, I set up thefunction w(m, y) (A.7a), which is an adaptation of the indirect utility function (A.6) for thelong-run equilibrium. Since the varieties’ prices are constant multiples of the respectivemarginal costs, I use the vector of the N goods’ marginal costs, m := (m1, . . . , mN ), as anindependent variable. The corresponding expenditure function is denoted by f (m, u) (A.7b).See appendix A.3.3.1. Bars are used to denote an arbitrary reference situation.Taking the difference between the income and the compensated income, as explained inappendix A.3.3.1, yields the overall impact as
I := y− f (m, w(m¯, y¯)) = [δ − δ¯∏i
(mim¯i
)αi/νˆ] L (4.13)
with νˆ :=∑i αiνi (4.14)as the average of the mark-up factors (4.6b), which is constant.
15 Note that S(φ) 6= φ∑i tiXi since Xi 6= nixi (4.1b), as opposed to what footnote 14 on page 22 suggests forchapter 3. Also, αi = PiXi/y = nipixi/y; see (4.2a) and (4.7b), respectively. See also (4.1b) and (4.3). So,αi 6= piXi/y, unlike in section 3.3.7.
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The scheme’s marginal overall impact is the derivative of I (4.13) with respect to φ, see(A.8), at δ¯ = δ and m¯ = m:
I ′ := dIdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ = δˆν
[∑
i αiχiνi + νˆ dδ/δdφ
] L . (4.15)
Figure 4.1 and figure 4.2 are numerical examples of the overall impact in the two–industryeconomy described in section 4.6. The welfare effects depicted in this chapter are calculatedfor discrete increases of φ, with φ¯ = 0 as the reference situation. Since y|φ=0 ≡ L = 100,the welfare effects are stated in percent of the without–scheme income. The white linesare the contours at a zero effect. If the scheme is free (4.12a), the marginal overall impactis positive; see figure 4.1. If the scheme is a subsidy (4.12b), there can be a negative(marginal) overall impact instead, provided that the (marginal) costs of the scheme exceedthe (marginal) gross overall impact on the household’s welfare; see figure 4.2.
4.5.2 Direct impact A.3.3.2
The discrete change in the scheme’s costs (4.9) is
∆S := S(φ)− S(φ¯) . (4.16)
The gross/net direct impacts, respectively, with ni = ni(φ), pi = pi(φ) and y = y(φ), are
∆CS := ∫ φφ¯
(∑
i ti ni(φ) xi(pi(φ), y(φ))
) dφ (4.17a)
D := ∆CS − ∆S . (4.17b)
For the rule of a half as an approximation thereof, see appendix A.3.3.2.The derivative of D (4.16–17) is the marginal direct impact:
D′ := dDdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ = δ
[χˆ + dδ/δdφ
] L ; (4.18)
see appendix A.3.3.2. Figure 4.3 and figure 4.4 are numerical examples of the direct impactin the two–industry economy described in section 4.6.16 If the scheme is free (4.12a), themarginal direct impact is positive; see figure 4.3. If the scheme is a subsidy (4.12b), the(marginal) direct impact is nonpositive because the (marginal) costs of the scheme are equalto or exceed the (marginal) aggregate transport cost reduction; see figure 4.4.
16 The welfare effects depicted in this chapter are calculated with the accurate direct impact, i.e., using (4.17a),and not the rule of a half (A.10).
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Figure 4.1 Overall impact in a two–industry economy with a free scheme (α1 = α2 = 0.5,m˜1 = m˜2 = 1, ν1 = 1.6, ν2 = 1.1, t2 = 0.2, L = 100, S(φ) = 0 (4.12a), φ¯ = 0)PSfrag replacements
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Figure 4.2 Overall impact in a two–industry economy with a subsidy (α1 = α2 = 0.5,m˜1 = m˜2 = 1, ν1 = 1.6, ν2 = 1.1, t2 = 0.2, L = 100, S(φ) = φ∑i tinixi (4.12b), φ¯ = 0)
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Figure 4.3 Direct impact in a two–industry economy with a free scheme (α1 = α2 = 0.5,m˜1 = m˜2 = 1, ν1 = 1.6, ν2 = 1.1, t2 = 0.2, L = 100, S(φ) = 0 (4.12a), φ¯ = 0)PSfrag replacements
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Figure 4.4 Direct impact in a two–industry economy with a subsidy (α1 = α2 = 0.5, m˜1 = m˜2 = 1,ν1 = 1.6, ν2 = 1.1, t2 = 0.2, L = 100, S(φ) = φ∑i tinixi (4.12b), φ¯ = 0)
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4.5.3 Wider impactA.3.3.3
The wider impact is W := I − D; see (A.11). The marginal wider impact can be inferredfrom I ′ (4.15) and D′ (4.18):
W ′ := dWdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ = I ′ −D′ = δˆν
[∑
i αiχi (νi − νˆ)
] L (4.19a)
= δˆν
[∑
i αi (χi − χˆ) (νi − νˆ)
] L . (4.19b)
The sign of this expression is that of the sum within the square brackets, which is the corre-lation between the industries’ mark-ups and transportation intensities. A single industry’ssummand is positive if the industry exhibits a mark-up and a transportation intensity thatare both either above or below the respective economy–wide averages. Figure 4.5 and fig-ure 4.6 are numerical examples of the wider impact in the two–industry economy describedin section 4.6.As I determined in section 3.3, economic activity needs to be shifted away from theindustries with lower mark-ups toward the industries with higher mark-ups for the marginalwider impact to be positive. What was not determined at the time is how economic activitywould shift, because demand was not specified. In this model, it is shifted toward theindustries with both relatively high mark-ups and relatively high transportation intensities.It follows from (4.1b) with (4.7a) and (4.8), or from (A.4), that
X ′iXi := dXi/Xidφ = νi
(χi + dδ/δdφ
) . (4.20)
Defining the relative quantity shift of a hypothetical average industry as
X´ ′ := νˆ (χˆ + dδ/δdφ
)
yields
W ′ = δˆν
[∑
i αi
(X ′iXi − X´ ′
)] L . (4.19c)
The marginal wider impact’s sign is that of the average of the relative quantity shifts’deviations from the average quantity shift, with the income shares for weights.With uniform transportation intensities, i.e., χi = χ ∀i⇒ χˆ = χ , see (4.11), the marginalwider impact is zero; see (4.19b). The relative quantity shifts (4.20) are proportional to theνi’s. If χ = −(dδ/δ)/dφ, these shifts are all zero and there is no welfare effect at all, whichis the case at φ = 0 with (4.12b); see (A.9) with (4.11). Examples with two industries andχ |φ=0 = 0.125 are illustrated in the bottom–right diagrams of figure 4.7 and figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.5 Wider impact in a two–industry economy with a free scheme (α1 = α2 = 0.5,m˜1 = m˜2 = 1, ν1 = 1.6, ν2 = 1.1, t2 = 0.2, L = 100, S(φ) = 0 (4.12a), φ¯ = 0)PSfrag replacements
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Figure 4.6 Wider impact in a two–industry economy with a subsidy (α1 = α2 = 0.5, m˜1 = m˜2 = 1,ν1 = 1.6, ν2 = 1.1, t2 = 0.2, L = 100, S(φ) = φ∑i tinixi (4.12b), φ¯ = 0)
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If all mark-ups that prevail in this economy are just the same, and thus equal to theiraverage, i.e., νi = ν ∀i ⇒ νˆ = ν, see (4.14), the marginal wider impact (4.19) is zero.Examples with ν = 1.6 are illustrated in the bottom–left diagrams of figure 4.7 and figure 4.8.
4.6 Two–industry economy
Consider the case of two industries with α1 = α2 = 0.5. Then (4.19) is
W ′ = δ2 (ν1 + ν2) (χ1 − χ2) (ν1 − ν2) L .
If and only if industry 1 is the industry with the higher mark-up, i.e., ν1 > ν2, then
χ1 > χ2 ⇔ t1/m1t2/m2 > ν1ν2 ⇔ W ′ > 0 .Since ν1/ν2 > 1, t1/m1 > t2/m2 does not suffice. The upper–left diagrrams of figure 4.7and figure 4.8 are examples with χ1|φ=0 = 5/16 > 2/11 = χ2|φ=0 ⇒ W ′|φ=0 > 0, and theupper–right diagrams are examples with χ1|φ=0 = 1/8 < 5/11 = χ2|φ=0 ⇒ W ′|φ=0 < 0.
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Figure 4.7 Overall and wider impact in a two–industry economy with a free scheme(α1 = α2 = 0.5, m˜1 = m˜2 = 1, L = 100, S(φ) = 0 (4.12a), φ¯ = 0)
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Figure 4.8 Overall and wider impact in a two–industry economy with a subsidy (α1 = α2 = 0.5,m˜1 = m˜2 = 1, L = 100, S(φ) = φ∑i tinixi (4.12b), φ¯ = 0)If the ratios between the transport cost reductions and the total marginal costs are iden-tical for the two industries, i.e., t1/m1 = t2/m2, then — whatever the mark-ups — themarginal wider impact is nonpositive:
W ′ = − δ (ν1 − ν2)22ν1ν2 (ν1 + ν2) t1m1 L ≤ 0 .
This shows up in figure 4.5 and figure 4.6, which are numerical examples with ν1 > ν2 andm˜1 = m˜2, but with a varying t1. If t1 ≤ t2 = 0.2, there is a negative marginal wider impactat φ = 0. If t1 is sufficiently high, there is a positive wider impact.In order for a scheme to have a positive wider impact, one first needs to make sure that theindustries differ with regard to their mark-ups. Second, one needs to make sure that theydiffer with regard to the transportation intensities. Third, the industries with the relativelyhigh transportation intensities need to be the less competitive ones in that they exhibithigher mark-ups.
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Monopoly A.4
In the style of what I considered in section 3.4, this model is that of an economy with twoindustries and two goods. The goods are called “good 1” and the “numeraire good”. Good 1is produced by a monopolist and with nondecreasing returns to scale. The numeraire good isproduced under perfect competition with constant returns to scale. Both industries employonly labor, which is supplied by the one representative household. Both the wage rate andthe marginal product of labor in the production of the numeraire good are one, so both laborand the numeraire good serve as numeraires. The household’s preferences are quasi-linear,with the marginal utility of good 1 being decreasing and that of the numeraire good beingconstant.Only the transport cost in the trade of good 1 between the monopolist and the consumeris reduced by the scheme. Since the mark-up charged by the monopolist is endogenous, acondition is stated for the price of good 1 to actually be decreased by the scheme. If it is,the marginal wider impact must be positive. This is because resources are shifted from theperfectly competitive industry toward the monopoly. Also due to the lack of an income effectin the consumption of good 1, this is a simple model to start assessing the wider impact onthe level of a single industry.In chapter 6, I consider two fully symmetric — though spatially distant — economies, eachequivalent to the economy of this chapter. This adds the possibility of reciprocal dumpingas the two firms of indusry 1 might export to each other’s domestic market undercuttingeach other’s monopoly price, thus creating two duopolies. Instead, they might attempt toward off the foreign competition by means of predatory pricing. Either way, they are unableto sustain their monopoly power as a result of the transport scheme.
5.1 Industry with imperfect competition
The variables and parameters of industry 1 are like those in the previous chapters, justwithout the subscript. The marginal cost is m := c + τ + (1− φ) t with c > 0 (production),τ ≥ 0 and t > 0 (transportation), φ ∈ [0, 1] as the progress of the scheme and m˜ := m|φ=0.The price, the mark-up, the quantity and the fixed costs are p, µ := p − m, X and f ≥ 0.
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The firm’s profit is pi := µX − f . (5.1)
Maximizing its profit, the firm charges a price of
p = εε − 1 m
with the price elasticity of demand as
ε := − d ln(X )d ln(p) > 1 ; (5.2)
see Mas-Colell et al. (1995, sec. 12.B, pp. 384–387), Varian (1999, ch. 24, pp. 414–432) orJehle & Reny (2011, p. 170 et seqq.). The mark-up atop the marginal cost follows as
µ = 1ε − 1 m > 0 . (5.3)
5.2 Household
The household has the quasi-linear utility function
u = u(X, z) := s(X ) + z (5.4)
with the strictly concave sub–utility function s(X ) and a marginal utility of good 1 that isgreater than this good’s price for sufficiently low quantities.17 The quantity of the numerairegood is denoted by z.Maximizing utility (5.4) subject to the budget constraint,
y = pX + z , (5.5)
yields the Marshallian demand function for good 1,
X = X (p) := s′−1(p) , (5.6a)
which is decreasing in p, and the demand function for the numeraire good,
z = z(p, y) := y− pX (p) .18 (5.6b)
Demand for good 1 is independent of the household’s income given a sufficiently high income.
17 The sub–utility function is such that s′(X ) := ds(X )/dX > 0, s′(0) > p and s′′(X ) := d2s(X )/dX 2 < 0. SeeMas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 45) or Varian (1992, sec. 10.3, pp. 164–166) for the quasi-linear utility function.18 The demand function is such that X ′(p) := dX (p)/dp < 0; see footnote 17.
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If and only if y ≥ pX (p), which is assumed to always be the case, the household will spendpX (p) on good 1 while spending the nonnegative residual of its income on the numerairegood, as given by (5.6).19
5.3 General equilibrium
The costs of the transport scheme, and accordingly the lump-sum tax, are
S = S(φ) (5.7)
with S(0) = 0 and S′(φ) := dS(φ)/dφ ≥ 0. The household receives an earned income of L,which is its exogenous endowment with labor, as well as the monopolist’s profit (5.1). Itsnominal disposable income follows as
y := L+ pi − S .20 (5.8)
With the numerical examples that follow, I distinguish between a transport scheme thatis free of cost, i.e., an exogenous cost reduction with
S(φ) = 0 , (5.9a)
and a transport scheme that is equivalent to a subsidy as
S(φ) = φtX . (5.9b)
The equilibrium condition of the labor market, which follows from the household’s income(5.8) with the budget constraint (5.5), is
L = mX + f + z + S . (5.10)
The first two summands to the right side of the equal sign are the variable and the fixedlabor input in the production of good 1, respectively. The third summand, z, is the input inthe production of the numeraire good. The fourth summand is the input in the provision ofthe transport scheme.
19 If it were that y ≤ pX (p), then X = y/p and z = 0. Thus, the demand functions would need to be definedin a way other than that of (5.6).20 It follows from (5.8) with (5.1) and (5.6a) that s′((L − f − S)/m) ≤ p ⇔ L − f − S ≥ mX (p) ⇔ y ≥ pX (p);cf. footnote 17.
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5.4 Welfare
5.4.1 Overall impactA.4.1
Solving the labor market’s equilibrium condition (5.10) for z, and substituting this into theutility function (5.4), along with the demand function for good 1 (5.6a), gives
u = w(p) := s(X (p))−mX (p) + L− f − S . (5.11)
This is an adaptation of the indirect utility function (A.12a) for the general equilibrium.Since the household’s utility function (5.4) is quasi-linear, the change in its utility isequal to the change in its consumer surplus as well as its compensating/equivalent variation(Varian, 1992, sec. 10.4, pp. 166–167). With bars denoting the parameters’ and variables’values in an arbitrary reference situation, the scheme’s additional costs are
∆S := S(φ)− S(φ¯) ; (5.12)
see (5.7). The overall impact is
I := u− u¯ = s(X (p))− s(X (p¯))− (mX (p)− m¯ X (p¯))− ∆S .21 (5.13)
It follows from the labor market’s equilibrium condition (5.10) that
dL = m dX + dz − (tX − S′(φ)) dφ = 0 . (5.14)
For the marginal overall impact, one can differentiate (5.11) or (5.13), and then use (5.14):
I ′ := dIdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ = dudφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ = µ X ′(p) dpdφ + t X (p)− S′(φ) = pX ′(p) dpdφ + dzdφ . (5.15)
This is the additional utility from a change in the quantity of good 1 plus the additionalutility from the change in the quantity of the numeraire good.
5.4.2 Direct impactA.4.2
Due to the quasi-linear preferences, there is no income effect with respect to good 1 sothat the demand curve for good 1 does not shift, and the change in consumer surplus on the
21 Since I is independent of the values of L and f , only a minimum of u¯ (5.11) can be calculated to comparethe welfare effects to. This minimum follows from L − f ≥ mX (p) + S(φ); see footnote 20. With figure 5.1,where S(φ) = 0 (5.9a), the condition is L − f ≥ 0.09⇒ u¯ ≥ 0.0975 as mX (p) is maximal at φ = 0.8. Withfigure 5.2, where S(φ) = φtX (5.9b), the condition is L−f ≥ 0.175⇒ u¯ ≥ 0.1825 as mX (p)+S(φ) = m˜ X (p)is maximal at φ = 1. The more costly the scheme is, the greater the abundance of resources beyond thefixed input of industry 1 needs to be.
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transport market is equal to both the compensating and the equivalent variation (Mas-Colellet al., 1995, p. 83). The gross/net direct impacts, respectively, with p = p(φ), are
∆CS := ∫ φφ¯ t X (p(φ)) dφ (5.16a)D := ∆CS − ∆S . (5.16b)
For the rule of a half, see appendix A.4.2.The derivative of the direct impact (5.16b), with (5.14), is
D′ := dDdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ = t X (p)− S′(φ) = mX ′(p) dpdφ + dzdφ . (5.17)
This is the additional input in the production of good 1 plus the additional input in theproduction of the numeraire good.
5.4.3 Wider impact A.4.3
The marginal wider impact, i.e., the derivative of W := I −D (A.13) at the reference values,with I ′ (5.15) and D′ (5.17), is
W ′ := dWdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ = I ′ −D′ = µ X ′(p) dpdφ . (5.18)
Since µ > 0 (5.3), there is a positive marginal wider impact if and only if the quantityproduced by the monopolist is increased. Since X ′(p) < 0, this is so if and only if dp/dφ < 0.If and only if demand is such that an increase in φ leads to a sufficiently moderate reduction,or even a rise, in the elasticity, i.e., (dε/ε)/dφ > −t/µ, then the consequent change in themark-up does not outweigh the simultaneous decrease in m, or it even complements it. Seeappendix A.4.3.Figure 5.1 and figure 5.2 illustrate examples of the welfare effects given a linear demandfor good 1 and a discrete increase in φ. The scheme is free of cost or a subsidy; see (5.9).Either way, the marginal wider impact is positive by choice of the demand function.The welfare effects on the level of the monopoly, I1, D1 and W , which correspond to theprevious figures, are illustrated in figure 5.3; cf. Mackie et al. (2011, Figure 21.3b, p. 521)and figure 3.1 on page 20. The scheme’s costs attributed to industry 1 in deriving I1 andD1 are ∆S1 := m¯X¯ − mX , which is the amount of labor withdrawn from the industry, and∆S = ∆S1 + z¯ − z; see (5.10). See also section 3.3.3.
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Chapter 6
Reciprocal dumping A.5
The framework below is based on the reciprocal dumping model originally presented byBrander (1981) and Brander & Krugman (1983), and it adds the possibility of firm entry.There are two fully identical, though spatially distant, economies of the type describedin chapter 5. In each economy — or region for that matter — there are two industriesand two goods. The one industry comprises a single firm which produces “good 1” withnondecreasing returns to scale. The other industry is perfectly competitive with constantreturns to scale, producing the “numeraire good”. Both industries of a region employ thelabor supplied by the one local representative household. Labor and the numeraire goodboth serve as numeraires because the wage rate and the marginal product of labor in theproduction of the numeraire good are both one, and the numeraire good can freely be tradedbetween the regions. The households are immobile between the regions. Their preferencesare quasi-linear with a decreasing marginal utility of good 1 and a constant marginal utilityof the numeraire good; see section 5.2.Good 1 can also be traded between the regions. Yet, the transport cost of exporting to theforeign region is higher than that of supplying the domestic consumer. So, maybe there areno exports but two regions with one monopoly each, with each region being equivalent tothe economy of chapter 5. As the full transport scheme eliminates the difference between thetransport costs of industry 1, exports do eventually occur, unless the firms engage in entrydeterrence; see section 6.3. The firms engage in reciprocal dumping into their respectiveforeign markets. They are able to undercut the monopoly price that is otherwise chargedby the respective incumbents. Consequently, Cournot–type duopolies emerge. Instead, thefirms might prevent each other’s entry through predatory price setting; see section 6.4.Whether there is firm entry or just the threat thereof, I assess how this influences thescheme’s wider impact in comparison to the sustained monopolies of chapter 5.Since the economies are fully symmetric, variables and parameters simultaneously applyto both of them. For a background on the welfare implications of reciprocal dumping, seeGreenhut et al. (1987, sec. 9.2.2, pp. 161–162) and Feenstra (2004, p. 241 et seqq.).
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6.1 Industry with imperfect competition
Industry 1’s marginal cost of production is c > 0, and τ ≥ 0 is its marginal cost of trans-portation unaffected by the scheme. The transport costs of the domestically consumed andthe exported units, which are both eliminated by the scheme, are denoted by td and te,respectively, with te > td ≥ 0. The total marginal costs are md := c + τ + (1− φ) td ≤c + τ + (1− φ) te =: me ⇒ md|φ=1 = c + τ = me|φ=1. Prior to the scheme, the totalmarginal costs are m˜d := md|φ=0 < me|φ=0 =: m˜e. I use the subscripts d and e for otherparameters and variables as well to distinguish between the firms’ two separate operationsof domestic supply and exporting.With xd denoting the domestically consumed quantity, xe denoting the exported quantityand X := xd + xe denoting the aggregate quantity, each per firm/region, the export share is
λ := xeX ∈ [0, 0.5] .
With p as the price and µd := p−md ≥ p−me =: µe as the mark-ups, the average mark-upis µˆ := (1− λ) µd + λµe. With f ≥ 0 as the fixed costs per firm, a firm’s profit is
pi := µˆX − f . (6.1)
6.2 General equilibrium
The lump-sum tax per household to cover the scheme’s costs is
S = S(φ) (6.2)
with S(0) = 0 and S′(φ) := dS(φ)/dφ ≥ 0. As each household supplies L units of labor andreceives the profit of one firm (6.1), each household’s disposable income amounts to
y := L+ pi − S . (6.3)
In the numerical examples given below, there is either a free scheme, i.e., an exogenouscost reduction with S(φ) = 0 , (6.4a)
or a transport subsidy with the corresponding costs of
S(φ) = φtˆX . (6.4b)
Here, tˆ := (1− λ) td + λte is the average transport cost reduction.
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The average of the total marginal costs is mˆ := (1− λ)md + λme. Setting a household’sincome (6.3) equal to its expenditures (5.5), yields the equilibrium condition of either region’slabor market: L = mˆX + f + z + S . (6.5)
6.3 Simultaneous moves A.5.1
Assume that the firms decide simultaneously about both their domestic and foreign supply.Maximizing profits, they charge a price on the domestic market and — if possible — on theforeign market of
p = pd(λ) := εε + λ− 1 md > md (6.6a)pe(λ) := εε − λ me ≥ me . (6.6b)
The elasticity, ε, is the price elasticity of market demand as defined by (5.2), with ε > 1−λ.See Varian (1999, sec. 27.8, pp. 481–482).I need to distinguish between the case of no interregional trade (corner solution) and thecase of interregional trade (interior solution). The relative mark-up that the firms are ableto charge on their domestic markets for as long as they do not have to compete with importsis denoted by ν. If memd ≥ ν := pd(0)md , (6.7)the firms are unable to compete on their foreign markets. Hence,
λ = xe = 0 and p = pd(0) = νmd ≤ me = pe(0) .
If pd(λ) ≤ pe(λ) (6.6) at any level of λ, there is no interior but only this corner solution.See, for instance, the case of φ = 0 in figure 6.1.Even when there is a corner solution, a gradual (further) rise of φ will eventually makethe marginal cost of exporting drop below the monopoly price. Figure 6.1 illustrates anexample where the intraregional transport cost is affected by the scheme as td > 0. Ifinstead td = 0, then pd(λ) would not be shifted. The solution to pd(λ) = pe(λ) with (6.6) —for me/md ≤ ν — is
p = ε2ε − 1 (md +me)λ = ε (md −me) +memd +me .This is the Nash equilibrium when each firm supplies the households of both regions.
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The export threshold νˇ := {ν|ν = me/md} is the solution to pd(0) = pe(0), cf. (6.7), andhence the lower bound on the marginal–cost ratios for which there is no interregional trade.It defines the scheme’s export threshold which needs to be exceeded for trade to occur as
φˇ :=

{φ ∣∣∣∣φ = m˜e − νm˜dte − νtd
} for m˜e/m˜d ≥ ν|φ=0
0 for m˜e/m˜d < ν|φ=0 .
For there not to be any exports prior to the scheme, i.e., λ = xe = 0 at φ = 0, it has tohold that m˜e/m˜d ≥ ν|φ=0. Then φˇ ≥ 0. Since me/md ≥ 1 is decreasing in φ, and sinceν > 1, it follows that me/md|φ=1 = 1 < ν|φ=1. So, φˇ < 1, and in conclusion, φˇ ∈ [0, 1).If m˜e/m˜d < ν|φ=0, there is trade between the regions even prior to the scheme. If φˇ = 0,the first part of, say, (6.8a) is obviously superfluous. If td = 0, then md ≡ c + τ and ν isconstant; if νˇ exists, then νˇ ≡ ν.The corner solutions and the interior solutions can be summarized by
p =

εε − 1 md for φ < φˇε2ε − 1 (md +me) for φˇ ≤ φ (6.8a)
λ =

0 for φ < φˇε (md −me) +memd +me for φˇ ≤ φ . (6.8b)
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6.3.1 Overall impact A.5.1.1
Solving (6.5) for z and substituting this into the utility function (5.4), along with the demandfunction for good 1 (5.6a), gives a household’s utility in general equilibrium:
u = w(p) := s(X (p))− mˆ X (p) + L− f − S . (6.9)
This is an adaptation of the indirect utility function (A.12a) with equilibrium income (6.3).As the scheme progresses, it causes additional costs of
∆S := S(φ)− S(φ¯) ;
see (6.2). The change in utility as given by w(p) (6.9), relative to some reference situationwhich is denoted by a bar, yields the overall impact as
I := u− u¯ = s(X (p))− s(X (p¯))− (mˆ X (p)− ¯ˆmX (p¯))− ∆S . (6.10)
This is the change in consumer surplus as well as the compensating/equivalent variation(Varian, 1992, sec. 10.4, pp. 166–167).From the labor market’s equilibrium condition (6.5) follows
dL = mˆ dX + (1− φ) (te − td)X dλ+ dz − (tˆX − S′(φ)) dφ = 0 . (6.11)
The marginal change in I (6.10), I ′ := dI/dφ|φ¯=φ with (6.11), is
I ′ =

µd X ′(p) dpdφ + tdxd − S′(φ) for φ < φˇµˆ X ′(p) dpdφ − (1− φ) (te − td)X dλdφ + tˆX − S′(φ) for φˇ < φ ∨ φˇ = 0 (6.12a)= pX ′(p) dpdφ + dzdφ . (6.12b)
As long as a firm can keep its monopoly on the domestic market, i.e., as φ < φˇ ⇒ λ = 0,the welfare effects are equivalent to what is described in section 5.4.At the export threshold, i.e., at φ = φˇ, there is a leap in the marginal impact. Whilethe export share, λ, is zero, dλ/dφ jumps from zero to some positive value. This reducesthe marginal impact because an increasingly large share of what a household consumes ofgood 1 is imported from the other region, and imports are more costly than the domesticallyproduced units. Besides, there is a jump in dp/dφ while µˆ = µd > 0. If the increase incompetition accelerates the decline in the price, this increases the marginal impact andthereby counteracts the effect of the increase in the export share. Finally, there might besome jump in S′(φ). See appendix A.5.1.1.
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6.3.2 Direct impactA.5.1.2
Due to the quasi-linear preferences, good 1’s demand curve does not shift because thereis no income effect. Hence, the change in consumer surplus is equal to the compensatingand equivalent variations (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 83). The gross and net direct impacts,respectively, with tˆ = tˆ(φ) and p = p(φ), are
∆CS := ∫ φφ¯ tˆ(φ)X (p(φ)) dφ (6.13a)D := ∆CS − ∆S . (6.13b)
For the rule of a half as an approximation of ∆CS, see appendix A.5.1.2.The marginal direct impact, D′ := dD/dφ|φ¯=φ , follows from (6.13) with (6.11):
D′ = tˆX − S′(φ) (6.14a)
=

mdxd dpdφ + dzdφ for φ < φˇmˆX dpdφ + (1− φ) (te − td)X dλdφ + dzdφ for φˇ < φ ∨ φˇ = 0 . (6.14b)
6.3.3 Wider impactA.5.1.3
From I ′ (6.12) and D′ (6.14) follows the derivative of W := I −D (A.15):
W ′ := dWdφ
∣∣∣∣φ¯=φ =

µd X ′(p) dpdφ for φ < φˇµˆ X ′(p) dpdφ − (1− φ) (te − td)X dλdφ for φˇ < φ ∨ φˇ = 0 . (6.15)
The lower dp/dφ and dλ/dφ are, the higher is the marginal wider impact. In turn, these arethe lower, the higher dε/dφ is; see (A.14).The next four figures are numerical examples of the welfare effects. The light-colored linestherein are the effects with sustained monopolies as in section 5.4. A comparison betweenthe duopoly and the monopoly yields the following conclusion. At the export threshold, thejump to a positive dλ/dφ reduces W ′ because interregional trade consumes more resourcesthan intraregional trade. If the entry of the foreign firm leads to a jump to a lower dp/dφ,e.g., if it accelerates the price’s decline by posing additional competition, this increasesW ′. Figure 6.2 and figure 6.3, each with linear demand, exemplify leaps to lower levels ofW ′ at φ = φˇ. Figure 6.4 and figure 6.5, each with isoelastic demand, exemplify leaps tohigher levels of W ′. Besides, the marginal wider impact beyond φˇ is decreasing in λ andincreasing in p via µˆ, the average mark-up, if dp/dφ < 0.
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Figure 6.2 Welfare effect with simultaneous moves, linear demand and a free scheme(s(X ) = 1.2X − X 2, c + τ = 0.5, td = 0.5, te = 0.65, S(φ) = 0 (6.4a), φ¯ = 0)
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Figure 6.3 Welfare effect with simultaneous moves, linear demand and a subsidy(s(X ) = 1.2X − X 2, c + τ = 0.5, td = 0.5, te = 0.65, S(φ) = φtˆX (6.4b), φ¯ = 0)
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Figure 6.4 Welfare effect with simultaneous moves, isoelastic demand and a free scheme(X (p) = 100p−4, c + τ = 1, td = 0.4, te = 1, S(φ) = 0 (6.4a), φ¯ = 0)
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Figure 6.5 Welfare effect with simultaneous moves, isoelastic demand and a subsidy(X (p) = 100p−4, c + τ = 1, td = 0.4, te = 1, S(φ) = φtˆX (6.4b), φ¯ = 0)
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Figure 6.6 Welfare effect with entry deterrence, linear demand and a free scheme(s(X ) = 1.2X − X 2, c + τ = 0.5, td = 0.5, te = 0.65, S(φ) = 0 (6.4a), φ¯ = 0)
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Figure 6.7 Welfare effect with entry deterrence, linear demand and a subsidy (s(X ) = 1.2X − X 2,c + τ = 0.5, td = 0.5, te = 0.65, S(φ) = φtˆX (6.4b), φ¯ = 0)
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Figure 6.8 Welfare effect with entry deterrence, isoelastic demand and a free scheme(X (p) = 100p−4, c + τ = 1, td = 0.4, te = 1, S(φ) = 0 (6.4a), φ¯ = 0)
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Figure 6.9 Welfare effect with entry deterrence, isoelastic demand and a subsidy (X (p) = 100p−4,c + τ = 1, td = 0.4, te = 1, S(φ) = φtˆX (6.4b), φ¯ = 0)
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6.4 Strategic entry deterrence
So far, I assumed that when a firm exports to the foreign region, it makes its decisionsimultaneously to the incumbent firm. This section is a digression in that this decision isassumed to be sequential. The incumbent firm has the first–mover advantage. It anticipatesthe potential entrant’s reaction (6.6b) and engages in strategic entry deterrence by meansof predatory pricing. It sets its price equal to the total marginal cost of exports so that thepotential entrant does not actually export:
p =

εε − 1 md for φ < φˇme for φˇ ≤ φλ = 0 .
The marginal wider impact follows from (6.15):
W ′ =
µd X
′(p) dpdφ for φ < φˇ(1− φ) (te − td) (−te X ′(p)) ≥ 0 for φˇ < φ ∨ φˇ = 0 .
The leap in this marginal wider impact at φˇ is bigger than with simultaneous moves orsustained monopolies since dp/dφ jumps to a lower level and dλ/dφ = 0. Since the fullscheme, φ = 1, equalizes the total marginal costs and the price, it reduces the mark-upsand the marginal wider impact to zero.The four figures above include the corresponding results for the numerical examples ofsection 6.3. They all exhibit positive leaps in W ′ at the export threshold, and — for themost part — the wider impacts beyond φˇ are higher than in the case of simultaneous moves.Figure 6.6 and figure 6.7, each with linear demand, exemplify wider impacts as a result ofa full scheme, W |φ=1, that are lower than in the monopoly case. Figure 6.8 and figure 6.9,each with isoelastic demand, exemplify full schemes that yield wider impacts that are higherthan in the monopoly case.Assume that td = 0; so, W ′ = 0 for φ < φˇ since the transport scheme does not affect thecosts of intraregional trade. Beyond the export threshold, the scheme does not create anyinterregional trade. Though, it does give rise to a wider impact by creating the threat offirm entry for the spatial monopolists. This threat could be brought about through a subsidyrather than an infrastructure investment, and this subsidy would be free of cost because itwould not create any exports which would in turn induce subsidy payments.
End of part I 
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In this part, I set up a core–periphery model that typically exhibits a catastrophic transitionfrom dispersion to agglomeration when the transport cost declines and passes the thresholdcalled the “break point”. Given a transport cost right above the break point, it suffices tobring about an infinitesimal reduction in the transport cost, by means of some scheme, togive rise to this transition. This scheme would entail virtually no costs, and it would entailvirtually no direct impact on welfare. Though, since it triggers a cumulative process ofmigration, it might cause a change in overall welfare. This impact would constitute a widerimpact because there is virtually no direct impact. I show that the sign of this wider impactresulting from agglomeration is ambiguous within the applied model, and I investigate thesign’s determinants.At high levels of the transport cost, dispersion typically exhibits a higher welfare levelthan agglomeration, and vice versa at low levels of the transport cost. The correspondingtransport cost threshold of equal welfare levels is called the “utility switch” as agglomerationswitches from being disadvantageous to being advantageous at the instant that the transportcost falls below it. So, if the break point is lower than the utility switch, there is a positivewider impact of the economy’s transition to agglomeration as it brings about an increase inoverall welfare, and vice versa.Unlike part I, which comprehends models that are somewhat related, though quite dis-tinct, this part only contains a single model. It is introduced in its most comprehensiveform in chapter 7. Yet, this base model lacks analytical solvability for the most part andrequires certain qualifications. By zooming in on one of three distinct cases with regard tothe resources’ substitutability in production, the model becomes more tractable. The twodistinct cases that are relevant are described separately in the two subsequent chapters.Chapter 8 covers a substitutional case with a finite degree of substitutability. Chapter 9covers the limitational case, i.e., that of no substitutability. These two versions do not justoffer additional insights because they are relatively simple and tractable. They also allowfor concise breakdowns of all parameter constellations and the corresponding sign of thewider impact. The case of an infinite substitutability is irrelevant because it exhibits onlyagglomeration, and thus no transition.
Transport costs
I do not consider an actual transport scheme as it suffices to have an infinitesimal reductionin the transport cost. I rather just evaluate the effect of an exogenous reduction in thetransport cost. In doing so, the point of reference is a sufficiently high level of the transportcost for dispersion to be stable which is as low as possible for an infinitesimal reductionthereof to give rise to the economy taking on an agglomerated state. In other words, theinitial transport cost is right above the break point.
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Iceberg–type transport costs
I model the transport costs as “iceberg costs” (Samuelson, 1954, 1983). To denote the unitsproduced and shipped per unit arriving at its destination, I use τ ≥ 1. Within either of thetwo regions of this model, trade is generally free of cost, and there only is one type of goodfor which trade between the regions is not free. The transport costs are uniform over allproducers as well as symmetric.
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Base model B.2
In order to investigate a transport cost reduction’s wider impact resulting from an alterationof the spatial pattern, I avail myself of the literature of the New Economic Geography (NEG).More precisely, I implement a center–periphery (CP) model much like that first presented byKrugman (1991), except for the one important adaptation motivated and presented below.22The CP model has a general equilibrium framework so that, beyond the impact on thecenter due to increased agglomeration therein, the impact on the economy’s periphery dueto emigration is also considered.There are two types of industries, one agricultural and one manufacturing. The agri-cultural industry (called “A-sector”) is perfectly competitive with constant returns to scale,and it produces one homogeneous good. The manufacturing industry (called “M-sector”)features monopolistic competition as developed by Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) with increasingreturns to scale, and it produces a large number of differentiated varieties.23 Any agricul-tural or industrial firm’s production facility is located in one of the two identical regionsdenoted by r, s ∈ {1, 2} with r 6= s.Transporting the agricultural produce (called “A-good”) is free of cost. The transportationof the manufactures (called “M-good”) is only free within a region. Between the regions,whatever the direction of trade is, the transport cost per unit delivered is that of producingτ − 1 units of output. The households demand these goods, and they supply the firms withthe factors of production.With what is left of the general structure yet to be described, I depart from the modelby Krugman (1991). The elements in question concern the allocation of resources and thetechnology with which the A-sector firms produce. Krugman assumes two industry–specificfactors of production, namely skilled labor and unskilled labor, and every household suppliesone unit of either the one or the other. Though, effectively having two types of householdscomplicates any assessment of an effect on social welfare, especially since unskilled laboris immobile so that its welfare levels might differ between the regions.
22 For Krugman’s center–periphery model, see also Fujita et al. (1999, ch. 5), Brakman et al. (2009, ch. 3–4) orBaldwin et al. (2003, ch. 2).23 For the Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, see also Fujita et al. (1999, ch. 4), Feenstra (2004,ch. 5) or Baldwin et al. (2003, ch. 2).
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The way that I evade any such difficulties is by assuming every household to be of thesame type as they all possess equal amounts of the two factors of production, which areland and labor. The total number of households in the economy is L := 2. Every householdsupplies one unit of labor to either of the industries in either of the regions. They can freelymove, but they must always reside in the region of the firm that employs their labor.24 Hence,the distribution of the total labor force, L, among the industries and regions is endogenous.The economy’s endowment with the immobile land, however, is Br := 1 per region, and thehouseholds own equal shares of both of these units, irrespective of their place of residence.So, they all receive the same rent, which they then repatriate to wherever they reside. Theythen spend their income in that region on domestically produced as well as imported goods.While the manufacturing industry only employs labor, the agricultural industry employslabor in combination with land. With the two factors both being utilized in the productionof the A-good, they can be substitutable to some degree. This substitutability is limited inchapter 8. Chapter 9 considers the distinct case where the factors are not substitutable,making this most like the model by Krugman.Though still, due to the deviations from it explained above, there are no sustainableequilibria with different welfare levels for different types of households, or even householdsof the same type who reside in different regions. Once a process of migration toward theregion and/or industry promising the highest welfare has abated and all welfare levels haveequalized, i.e., once such a sustainable equilibrium has been reached, there only is onewelfare level as there only is one type of household. Social welfare thus simply parallelsindividual welfare. Evaluating a transition from one equilibrium to another, welfare, if itchanges at all, either rises for all households or falls for all households.
7.1 PreferencesB.2.1
The utility of any household in region r from consuming the homogeneous A-good and thecomposite M-good is given by a Cobb–Douglas function in combination with a CES functiondescribing the M-good’s composition of its differentiated varieties:
ur := (XMr )µ (XAr )1−µ (7.1a)
XMr = UM (xr) := (∑i (xir)
σ−1σ
) σσ−1 . (7.1b)
In units per household, XAr is the quantity of the A-good that is consumed in r, and XMris the quantity of the M-good that is consumed in r. The latter is an amount measured in
24 With regard to the households’ mobility, I make a distinction between the short run and the long run, asexplained in section 7.4. Free movement between the regions only applies to the latter.
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units of the composite, which is made up of xr units of the various varieties. This is in turna vector containing the amount of every variety i, each denoted by xir . As is apparent fromthe demand function (7.2a), µ ∈ (0, 1) is the income share spent on the M-good. It is oneof the parameters that are pivotal in respect of the model’s outcome. Another is σ ∈ (1,∞),which is the constant elasticity of substitution with regard to any couple of varieties of theM-good.With yr denoting the nominal income of a household in r, and with PA and PMr denotingthe goods’ respective prices, the budget constraint is PAXAr +PMr XMr = yr . The upper–tierMarshallian demand functions follow as
XMr = µyrPMr (7.2a)XAr = (1− µ)yrPA = (1− µ)yr . (7.2b)The price of the A-good is uniform over space due to the perfect competition, the constantreturns to scale and the absence of transport costs. Besides, I select the A-good to bethe numeraire, so PA := 1. The price of the M-composite, though, is region–specific. Thelower–tier Marshallian demand function for any variety i is
xir = (pir)−σ (PMr )σ−1 µyr , (7.2c)
with pir as the price of this variety when sold in region r, whiile not necessarily beingproduced in this very region. This demand function is isoelastic, and σ is the price elasticityof demand for any variety of the M-good.25 The price of the industrial goods’ composite isa price index of the varieties’ prices:
PMr = (∑i (pir)1−σ
) 11−σ . (7.3)
See appendix B.2.1 (Fujita et al., 1999, sec. 4.1, pp. 46–49).
7.2 Industries
Section 7.2.1 sets up the part of the model which relates to the agricultural industry. Itis stated in its most comprehensive form, i.e., for any degree of substitutability betweenland and labor. When considering the two distinct cases of the subsequent chapters, I offercorresponding versions of it. The part of the model relating to the manufacturing industry,which is described in section 7.2.2, remains unaffected thereof.
25 A single variety’s price is assumed to have a negligible effect on PMr due to being one of — supposedly —very many varieties’ prices.
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7.2.1 Agriculture
The production function is a linear–homogeneous CES function of lAr and br , which are theamount of labor and the amount of land, respectively. Due to the constant returns to scaleand the perfect competition, I consider a region’s A-sector to be one entity, and the inputsare thus to be understood as those of agriculture in region r as a whole. The amount of theagricultural product that is collectively produced in r is
Ar :=

η( lArγ
) κ−1κ + (1− η)br κ−1κ
 κκ−1 for κ > 0 ∧ κ 6= 1 (7.4a)
( lArγ
)η br1−η for κ = 1 (7.4b)
min{lAr /γ, br} for κ = 0 . (7.4c)
Denoting the elasticity of substitution between the two factors of production is κ ∈ [0,∞).This represents what I have referred to as the “degree of substitutability”. The parametersη ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0,∞) jointly govern the relative input of land and labor. If κ = 0, ηdisappears from the production function and γ needs to be used to adjust labor’s units ofmeasurement. If κ > 0, it suffices to set γ := 1 and only use η. Anyway, γ is never left outfrom the description of this chapter, to guarantee for consistency.Albeit that (7.4a) is not defined for an elasticity of substitution of either zero or one,the CES function’s distinct forms of κ approaching either of these two values or infinityare well-defined. If κ → 1, the production function is of the Cobb–Douglas type (7.4b).This is the one distinct case of this model, and it is covered in section 8.1. If κ → 0+,the production function is of the Leontief type (7.4c). This case is covered in section 9.1.Both distinct forms follow from applying de l’Hôpital’s rule to (7.4a); see Saito (2012).26If κ → ∞, land and labor are perfect substitutes, which is apparent as all exponents in(7.4a) approach one, rendering the production function linear. This case is ignored becauseit makes the model exhibit full agglomeration for any level of the transport cost, and henceno transition.Due to perfect competition, the agricultural industry generates a zero profit, and it sup-plies whatever it can produce given the available resources. The corresponding equilibriumcondition of the A-good’s market does not need to be stated explicitely, but it is fulfilledthrough Walras’ law.27 The conditions that constitute this model’s system of equations(7.10–11) are developed hereafter. Section 7.4 summarizes and concludes the setup.
26 For the CES function, see Varian (1992, p. 19 et seq.) or Jehle & Reny (2011, p. 130 et seq.). See Abramowitz& Stegun (1965, p. 13) for de l’Hôpital’s rule.27 See Walras (1954, § 123, pp. 168–169), van Daal & Jolink (1993, pp. 36–39), Varian (1999, sec. 29.6, pp.517–518) or Jehle & Reny (2011, p. 204 et seqq.) for Walras’ law.
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In order to determine the equilibrium conditions of the markets for agricultural labor andland, I first use the optimality condition for cost minimization that the marginal rate oftechnical substitution between inputs is to equal their relative price. The factor prices aredenoted by wAr for the wage rate in agriculture and Rr for the rent:
MRTSlb := − dbrdlAr
∣∣∣∣dAr=0 = ∂Ar/∂l
Ar∂Ar/∂br = ηγ (1− η)
(γbrlAr
)1/κ != wArRr (7.5a)
⇒ wAr = ηγ (1− η)
(γbrlAr
)1/κ Rr .28 (7.5b)
Either region’s unit of land is supplied fully inelastically given a positive rent. For simplicity,I consider equilibrium supply and demand as always being br = Br = 1; see section 7.4.Since the agricultural product is the numeraire, it follows from the zero profit condition,wAr lAr + Rrbr = PAAr , with (7.4a) and (7.5b) that the equilibrium rent is
Rr = (1− η)
η( lArγ
) κ−1κ + (1− η)
1κ−1 . (7.10a)
Substituting (7.10a) back into (7.5b) yields the equilibrium wage rate as
wAr = ηγ
η + (1− η)( lArγ
) 1−κκ  1κ−1 . (7.10b)
These inverse demand functions declare the factor prices that ensure the demand of oneunit of land plus lAr units of agricultural labor. Their distinct forms are (8.2) for κ = 1 and(9.2) for κ = 0.
7.2.2 Manufacturing B.2.2
There are nr manufacturing firms in region r, each producing one differentiated variety, andeach variety is in turn only produced by one firm. Hence, the number of varieties producedin r is equal to nr . The price that the manufacturers pay for both their m units of constantmarginal input and their F units of fixed input per firm, the wage rate in manufacturing, isdenoted by wMr .Maximizing their profits subject to the demand function (7.2c), all firms in region r chargea mill price of pr = σσ − 1 wMr m . (7.6)
28 If κ = 0, the production function (7.4c) is not differentiable at lAr /γ = br ; i.e., MRTSlb can not be determinedand (7.5) does not apply. See section 9.1.
66 Chapter 7 Base model
So, the consumer prices are pir = pr and pis = τpr if firm i is located in r.29 Even though afirm is able to charge a mark-up on its marginal cost, it earns a zero profit due to the freeentry and exit of firms. The quantity that allows it to cover its fixed costs is
q ≡ (σ − 1) Fm , (7.7)
irrespective of location or wage rate. To produce this quantity, a firm employs a total ofmq+ F = σF workers. Hence, the equilibrium number of firms in region r is
nr = lMrσF , (7.8)
with lMr being the number of workers in this region’s M-sector.Having derived the demand for any one variety as (7.2c) and the supply thereof as (7.7),the M-sector’s wage equation is obtained from the equilibrium condition for any variety’smarket: wMr = (Yr (PMr )σ−1 + φYs (PMs )σ−1)1/σ . (7.10c)
See appendix B.2.2. The variable Yr denotes the total nominal income of all the householdsin region r and thus their total expenditure on both goods combined. As a measure of tradefreeness, I use φ := τ1−σ ∈ (0, 1].There are two mill prices, one per region that is. Consumers in region r need to paypr per unit of any domestically produced variety and τps per unit of consumption of anyvariety that is imported from region s. Hence, the price index of the composite manufacture(7.3) can be written as
PMr = µ 1σ−1 (lMr (wMr )1−σ + φlMs (wMs )1−σ) 11−σ (7.10d)
by use of (7.6) and (7.8); see appendix B.2.2. I set m := (σ − 1) /σ and F := µ/σ by choiceof units, and without loss of generality, in deriving (7.10c–d).
7.3 Income
As all households own equal shares of land in both regions, the rents are distributed equallyamong them. In addition to the rents, every household supplies one unit of labor and earnsthe corresponding wage rate so that agricultural and industrial workers, respectively, receive
29 A single firm’s decision is assumed to have only a negligible impact on PMr by simultaneously assuming alarge nr , as mentioned in footnote 25 with regard to the price elasticity of demand.
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individual nominal incomes of
yAr := Rr + Rs2 + wAr (7.9a)yMr := Rr + Rs2 + wMr . (7.9b)
A region’s aggregate nominal income is
Yr = lAr yAr + lMr yMr . (7.9c)
7.4 General equilibrium B.2.3
The system of equations that describes the general equilibrium has already been set up forthe most part. An equilibrium on the land market of r is brought about by a rent of
Rr = (1− η)
η( lArγ
) κ−1κ + (1− η)
1κ−1 . (7.10a)
An equilibrium on the agricultural labor market of r is brought about by a wage of
wAr = ηγ
η + (1− η)( lArγ
) 1−κκ  1κ−1 . (7.10b)
A wage of wMr = (Yr (PMr )σ−1 + φYs (PMs )σ−1)1/σ , (7.10c)
with PMr = µ 1σ−1 (lMr (wMr )1−σ + φlMs (wMs )1−σ) 11−σ , (7.10d)
yields the clearing of the market for industrial products while (7.9) pose as the households’budget constraint. To complete the system of equations, an equilibrium condition needs tobe added for the distribution of labor. Since I make a distinction between the short run andthe long run with regard to the households’ mobility, this equilibrium condition needs to bechosen accordingly.If the distribution of labor across regions and industries was exogenous, the correspondingcondition would be lAr +lAs +lMr +lMs = 2, which would need to be applied to (7.9a–10d). Yet,workers are more or less mobile, depending on the presumed time frame. I assume workersto always be mobile within regions — even in the short run — so that the intraregionaldistributions are left to the market. Only in the long run, though, they are also mobilebetween regions. So, in the short run, the distribution of labor between regions is exogenous.
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It is expressed in terms of the shares of the economy’s total labor force employed by thefirms in either region, λr := lAr + lMr2 , (7.10e)with λr ∈ [0, 1] and λr + λs = 1 . (7.10f)
A condition needs to be included that constitutes whether an intraregional distributionis in equilibrium. Since workers are attracted by the industry that pays the higher wage,they gradually switch to this industry. Possibly, they thereby make the wages converge.Yet, diverging wages do not preclude a sustainable equilibrium. One must allow for cornersolutions in the sense that the workers of a region concentrate in one industry. In order toencompass all possible distributions without intraregional incentives for migration, I use
max{(wMr − wAr ) lAr , (wAr − wMr ) lMr } = 0 . (7.10g)
This complementarity makes sure that, if the wages diverge, there can only be workers inone of the two industries, and this industry must pay a wage at least as high as what thefirms of the other industry were to pay if there were any. Equalized wages are of course asufficient condition for any distribution to be in equilibrium.After selecting a value for the exogenous λr , (7.9a–10g) yield the general equilibrium,including the households’ intraregional distributions. Since all households in region r earnthe same wage, it makes sense to define this wage and the corresponding individual income:
wr := max{wAr , wMr } (7.10h)
yr := Rr + Rs2 + wr = max{yAr , yMr } . (7.10i)
The aggregate income, Yr = λr2yr , (7.10j)
follows from (7.9c) by use of (7.10e) and (7.10g–i). This system of equations (7.10) describesthe short-run equilibrium. It is summarized as (B.1) in appendix B.2.3.For interregional comparisons, I define the welfare levels of either type of household,
ωAr := yAr (PMr )−µ (7.11a)ωMr := yMr (PMr )−µ . (7.11b)
and the welfare level in a short-run equilibrium of any household in r,
ωr := yr (PMr )−µ = max{ωAr , ωMr } . (7.11c)
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These represent the households’ real incomes. They are expressed by a division throughconstants of the indirect utility function, which arises from (7.1a) with (7.2a–b).To see how the regions’ short-run welfare levels relate, and to infer from it the directionof interregional migration, the welfare difference can be computed for varying levels of λr .Figure 7.1 is a depiction for varying levels of τ .30 Figure 7.2 is a so-called “wiggle diagram”,which is a depiction for a single level of the transport cost. The wiggle diagrams distinguishbetween the welfare difference between the agricultural industries, ωAr −ωAs , and the welfaredifference between the manufacturing industries, ωMr − ωMs . The two can only diverge ifeither of the industries is nonexistent in either of the regions; see (7.10g) and note thatwAr ≥ wMr ⇔ ωAr ≥ ωMr and wAr ≤ wMr ⇔ ωAr ≤ ωMr . In all chosen examples, this is themanufacturing industry in the periphery so that ωr −ωs = ωAr −ωAs . I generally ignore thepossibility of a periphery with only manufacturing and no agriculture, as explained below.The vertical distance between the solid and the dashed line in a wiggle diagram is ωAr −ωMron the left-hand side and ωMs − ωAs on the right-hand side.PSfrag replacements
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Figure 7.1 Short-run equilibria with a varying transport cost (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 8)
30 The levels of the transport cost denoted by τb, τs and τu are the break point (see page 74), the sustain point(see page 78), and the utility switch (see page 80), respectively.
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Figure 7.2 Short-run equilibria with no transport cost (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4, σ = 8,τ = 1)
In the case of an uneven distribution of labor between the regions, I identify the center asregion 1 and the periphery as region 2; i.e., λ1 > 0.5. As mentioned above, there is either aninterior solution or a corner solution in terms of the labor distribution within the periphery.The former is an equilibrium with wA2 = wM2 and lM2 ≥ 0. The latter is an equilibrium withlM2 = 0 and wA2 ≥ wM2 . The number of workers in the periphery’s A-sector is positive, i.e.,lA2 > 0, unless λ2 = 0. The kinks in the solid line of figure 7.2 are the “transition points”between interior and corner solutions; so, they are characterized by lM2 = 0 and wA2 = wM2 .In figure 7.1, the transition points are depicted by white lines. The line along the crest inthe front, where λr > 0.5, is visible. There is a corresponding line running along the rift inthe back, which is hidden.Everything up to this point considered the short run with only intraregional mobility. Inthe long run, though, I assume workers to also be mobile between regions. They wish toreside in a region with a welfare level that is at least as high as that of the other region, andthey will gradually relocate if this is not the case. If ωr−ωs > 0, then λr will increase, andvice versa, until a long-run equilibrium is eventually attained. Any short-run equilibriumwhich satisfies ωr − ωs = 0 is such a long-run equilibrium. So is any equilibrium with allhouseholds in the center which is sustainable as the center exhibits a welfare level that isat least as high as that in the periphery. To allow for either,
max {(ωs − ωr) λr , (ωr − ωs) λs} = 0 (7.11d)
and (7.11c) need to be appended to the short-run system of equations (7.10) to produce thelong-run system of equations (7.10–11); λr is now endogenous. See appendix B.2.3. Theblack lines in figure 7.1, whether thin or thick, indicate the long-run equilibria, which arealso depicted in figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.3 Long-run equilibria with a varying transport cost (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 8)
Apart from stability and instability, which is explained later, there are at least two types oflong-run equilibria. In a fully symmetric two-region model like this, there always exists thesymmetric one with perfect dispersion, as explained in section 7.4.1. All the other equilibriaexhibit some degree of concentration. These concentrated long-run equilibria, especiallythe fully concentrated ones, which might or might not exist, are explained in section 7.4.2.“Full concentration” refers to the manufacturing industry only producing in the center sothat, if anything, only agriculture takes place in the periphery. “Partial concentration”refers to agglomeration of some lesser degree.31 Section 7.4.3 compares full concentrationto dispersion. Whether the latter is stable, is explored on page 74. Whether the former,which is almost always stable if it exists, does actually exist, is explored on page 78.An important qualification needs to be made in respect to the type of concentration thatunfolds when there are so few — but some — workers in a region, typically the periphery,that they are all employed by the same industry. This requires a distinction regarding theelasticity of substitution in agriculture. If κ ∈ [1,∞), it can only ever be the manufacturingindustry that does not operate in a region, because — if the supply of labor is sufficientlylow — the agricultural firms pay a wage high enough to absorb this entire supply, but notvice versa; i.e., λr > 0 ⇔ lAr > 0 and λr = 0 ⇔ lAr = 0. This is because limlAr →0+ wAr = ∞while limlMr →0+ wMr is finite.32 It follows that the periphery exhibits a higher welfare levelthan the center if λ2 is sufficiently low, as limλ2→0+ ω2 = ∞. Thus, a short-run equilibriumwith, say, λ2 = 0 is not sustainable in the long run. Fully concentrated long-run equilibriaare such that λ2 ∈ (0, 0.5) since there is some agriculture in the periphery. Figure 7.3 isan example with κ = 1.
31 Some important remarks concerning the rare case of more than two types of concentrated long-run equilibriaare made in section 7.4.3 and explained in more detail in appendix B.2.3.2.32 For wAr with κ ∈ (1,∞), see (7.10b). For κ = 1, see (8.2b) on page 81.
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If κ ∈ [0, 1), then wAr ≤ limlAr →0+ wAr = ηκ/(κ−1)/γ.33 I.e., the agricultural firms of region rare unable to produce at an average cost of PA = 1 if the wage is too high. This indicatesthat the manufacturing firms might pay a wage high enough to absorb the entire labor supplywhile the agricultural firms are unable to compete, both on this region’s labor market andthe A-good’s market. Nevertheless, I have not found a single numerical example of a short-run equilibrium with lAr = 0 but lMr > 0. This is why I suppose that equilibria with fullintraregional concentration in manufacturing do not exist, with any κ ∈ [0,∞).34 In a short-run equilibrium with λ2 = 0, the periphery might exhibit a lower welfare level than the centerso that this equilibrium is sustainable. For an example of such a long-run equilibrium, seesection 9.2.2.For simplicity, I assume that the agricultural firms of region r always demand a quantityof land of br = Br . The complementarity of the land market, as Br = 1, is
max {(1− br)Rr , br − 1} = 0 .
It would only be possible for the quantity demanded to be br < 1 if Rr = 0, since thehouseholds would be indifferent regarding their supply. This requires a distinction regardingthe elasticity of substitution in agriculture. If κ ∈ (1,∞), Rr ≥ Rr |lAr =0 = (1− η)κ/(κ−1) > 0as given by (7.10a). If κ ∈ (0, 1], then limlAr →0+ Rr = 0.35 Also, limlAr →0+ Ar = 0; see (7.4a–b).The rent can only be zero if the A-sector produces no output as it employs no labor, whateverthe amount of land it employs. Hence, the marginal product of land is zero. If κ = 0, thenRr = 0 only if lAr /γ < 1; see (9.2a). If so, Ar = lAr /γ; see (7.4c). Hence, the marginal productof land beyond br = lAr /γ is zero. In conclusion, only if the marginal product of land is zero,the rent can also be zero. Even if the A-sector fimrs would demand less than a region’s fullunit of land, I can set br = 1 because it makes no difference, neither with regards to costsnor with regards to output.
7.4.1 DispersionB.2.3.1
If the households are distributed evenly among the two regions, i.e., if λr = λs = 0.5, theeconomy takes on a fully symmetric state, which — to some extent — allows for an analyticalinvestigation. I use variables without the subscripts, e.g., R := Rr |λr=0.5 = Rs|λr=0.5, todenote both of the two corresponding region–specific variables. As I will show, there areworkers in both industries so that w = wA = wM and so forth.36 Since the welfare levelsare equal in the two regions, dispersion is generally a long-run equilibrium.
33 For wAr with κ ∈ (0, 1), see (7.10b). For κ = 0, see (9.2b) on page 90.34 If κ →∞, which I neglect, such equilibria do exist.35 For Rr with κ ∈ (0, 1), see (7.10a). For κ = 1, see (8.2a) on page 81.36 If κ →∞, which I neglect, it is possible that lA = 0, lM = 1 and w = wM ≥ wA; cf. footnote 34.
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The short-run system of equations (7.10) can be conflated to
R = (1− η)(η (lA/γ) κ−1κ + (1− η)) 1κ−1 (7.12a)
w = ηγ
(η + (1− η)(lA/γ) 1−κκ ) 1κ−1 (7.12b)
w = (Y (PM)σ−1 (1 + φ))1/σ (7.12c)
y = Y = R + w (7.12d)
PM = ( µ1− lA 11 + φ
) 1σ−1 w . (7.12e)
The long-run system of equations (7.11) can be conflated to
ω = y(PM)−µ . (7.13)
First, I demonstrate that there typically is a solution to (7.12). Dividing (7.12a) by (7.12b)gives (7.14), which is equivalent to (7.5), and combining (7.12c–e) gives (7.15):
Rw = γ (1− η)η (lA/γ)1/κ (7.14)Rw = 1− µ − lAµ . (7.15)
Equating the two yields an equation which needs to be solved numerically for lA:
lA + µ γ (1− η)η (lA/γ)1/κ = 1− µ . (7.16)
If κ ∈ (0,∞), a result exists with lA, lM ∈ (0, 1).37 If κ = 0, then lA = min {γ, 1− µ},though (7.12a–b), (7.14) and (7.16) do not apply at lA = γ; see section 9.2.1.By use of an additional variable, I formulate (7.12–13) in such a way that it can readilybe applied when calculating the dispersed equilibrium. The share of income that is earnedincome in the case of symmetry follows from (7.12d) with (7.14–15) as
δ := wy = µ1− lA = ηη + γ (1− η) (lA/γ)1/κ .38 (7.17)
37 The right-hand side of (7.16) is constant and positive; unless κ → ∞, the left-hand side is zero at lA = 0,yet increasing in lA. At lA = 1, the left-hand side is greater than the right-hand side. Hence, an lA ∈ (0, 1)must exist that fulfills (7.16).38 If κ = 0, then the last expression of (7.17) does not apply at lA = γ, and δ is given as (9.3). If κ →∞, thenδ ≡ max {η/ (η + γ (1− η)) , µ}.
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Rearranging (7.17) yields
lA = δ − µδ (7.18a)lM = µδ (7.18b)
as lM = 1− lA (7.10e). From (7.12–13) with (7.17) follow
R = (1− δ)Y (7.19a)w = δY = δy (7.19b)
w = 1γ
(ηκ 1− µδ − µ
) 1κ−1 ⇒ limκ→1 w = ηγ
(δ − µγδ
)η−1 (7.19c)
PM = ( δ1 + φ
) 1σ−1 w (7.19d)
and ω = 1δ
(1 + φδ
) µσ−1 w1−µ . (7.20)
The derivation of limκ→1 w is explained in appendix B.2.3.1.While the dispersed equilibrium always is a long-run equilibrium, it can be either stableor unstable. A long-run equilibrium is stable if migration in one direction or the other givesrise to higher welfare in the region of origin than in the destination region. If it does, thiscreates an incentive for subsequent migration in the opposite direction leading back to theoriginal equilibrium. If migration gives rise to higher welfare in the destination region, thelong-run equilibrium is unstable because an incentive is created for further migration in thesame direction triggering a cumulative process toward a different long-run equilibrium.Differentiating the short-run system of equations (7.10) and the welfare function (7.11c)while using hats to denote the variables’ relative changes, e.g., λˆ := d log λr , and evaluatingthe derivatives at λr = λs = 0.5, so that d log λs = −λˆ etc., one obtains
λˆ = lA lˆA + lM lˆM (7.21a)
wˆ = −1κ 1− ηη δ − µ1− µ (lA/γ) 1−κκ lˆA (7.21b)wˆ = Zσ (Yˆ + (σ − 1) PˆM) (7.21c)Yˆ = λˆ+ δwˆ (7.21d)
PˆM = Z ( 11− σ lˆM + wˆ
) (7.21e)
and ωˆ = δwˆ − µPˆM . (7.22)
7.4 General equilibrium 75
Integrating (7.21–22) yields the impact of immigration on local welfare as
ωˆˆλ = (δ/µ − ψZ ) (µ − δZ )σ/Z − δ − ψZ (σ − 1) + δZσ − 1 , (7.23)
with Z := (1− φ) / (1 + φ) ∈ [0, 1) as a measure of trade closedness and
ψ := 1− η1− η 1− µµ κσ − 1
(δ − µγδ
) κ−1κ . (7.24)
See appendix B.2.3.1. If ωˆ/λˆ < 0, then symmetry is stable, and it is unstable if ωˆ/λˆ > 0,depending on, among other parameters, the transport cost represented by trade closedness,Z . If Z = 0, symmetry is neither stable nor unstable.In the case of free trade, (7.23) is equal to zero, i.e., τ = 1⇔ Z = 0⇒ ωˆ/λˆ = 0, as onecan infer from figure 7.2. Effectively, migration only takes place between the manufacturingindustries, resulting in a proportional shift of firms. Yet, all the prices remain unaffected.As long as the supply of labor in the periphery does not fall below the demand by the localA-sector given a wage rate of w , migration from one region to the other has no impact oneither region’s welfare level, and thus does not create any incentives for migration.39
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Figure 7.4 Short-run equilibria with stable full concentration (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 8, τ = 1.35)
With a low but positive transport cost, i.e., a low τ > 1, as in figure 7.4, dispersion isunstable because, unless ψ → −∞,
ddZ ωˆˆλ
∣∣∣∣Z=0 = δ (2σ − 1)σ (σ − 1) > 0 . (7.25)
39 At Z = 0, according to (7.21c), (7.21e) and (7.22), ωˆ = wˆ = PˆM = 0, and according to (7.21b), lˆA = 0. From(7.21a) and (7.21d) follows Yˆ = λˆ = lM lˆM .
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In the wiggle diagrams, dispersion’s (in)stability (7.23) is illustrated by a gray, dashed,straight line with the wiggle’s slope at the dispersed equilibrium. Circles indicate unstablelong-run equilibria and are hence to be found on upward sections of a wiggle; points indicatestable long-run equilibria and are hence to be found on downward sections.With a prohibitive transport cost, i.e., with τ →∞, (7.23) approaches a finite value:
limZ→1 ωˆˆλ = (δ/µ − ψ) (µ − δ)σ − δ − ψ (σ − 1) + δσ − 1 . (7.26)
This value can be either positive or negative. If and only if it is negative, which is calledthe “no–black–hole condition”, there is a level of the transport cost, denoted by τb > 1, withωˆ/λˆ|τ=τb = 0 so that ωˆ/λˆ < 0 with any τ > τb. Otherwise, the dispersed equilibrium — atany level of τ — is not stable because (7.23) is nonnegative. If (7.26) is in fact negative,setting (7.23) equal to zero yields the break point:
τb := ( (ψµ/δ + δ/µ) (σ − 1) + δ + (2σ − 1)(ψµ/δ + δ/µ) (σ − 1) + δ − (2σ − 1)
) 1σ−1 . (7.27)
See appendix B.2.3.1. Figure 7.5 is a wiggle diagram similar to the previous ones, exceptthat τ = τb.40 If κ →∞⇒ ψ → −∞ and Z > 0, then ωˆ/λˆ = µ/ (σ − 1) > 0. Therefore, abreak point does not exist and dispersion is generally not stable. This is why the case ofperfect substitutability of land and labor is irrelevant with regard to the welfare assessment,because a transition from dispersion to agglomeration does not occur.
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Figure 7.5 Short-run equilibria at the break point (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4, σ = 8,τ = τb ≈ 1.5)
40 The break point is (usually) the maximum value of τ for which the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, whichis why this equilibrium is depicted as a circle in figure 7.5. This can be inferred from the welfare differencebeing nondecreasing in the labor share at and around symmetry because more than marginal immigrationturns the welfare difference positive. Cf. figure B.2 in appendix B.2.3.2.
7.4 General equilibrium 77
Figure 7.6 depicts an example with τ > τb, and hence stable dispersion. Further increasesin τ are considered in section 7.4.2, with dispersion remaining stable. Graphical depictionsof ωˆ/λˆ (7.23) as a function of τ can be found in section 8.3.
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Figure 7.6 Short-run equilibria with stable dispersion and full concentration (γ = 1, η = 0.7,κ = 1, µ = 0.4, σ = 8, τ = 1.6)
7.4.2 Concentration
Figure 7.6 depicts partially concentrated as well as fully concentrated long-run equilibria.The former are of no particular interest due to their typical instability.41 The latter featuremanufacturing only in the center, and hence only agriculture in the periphery, if anything.They are virtually always stable — if they exist. Whether they do exist, or whether fullyconcentrated short-run equilibria are not actually sustainable in the long run, and whetherthey yield a higher or lower welfare than symmetry, is determined hereafter.Consider long-run migration commencing at the transition point, i.e., at the fully concen-trated short-run equilibrium with the highest possible number of workers in the periphery.If ω1 − ω2 > 0 as welfare is lower in the periphery than in the center, there is migrationtoward the center. Either the welfare difference turns zero at some point, bringing migrationto a halt, or the households all leave the periphery without the welfare difference ceasingto be positive. Either way, a fully concentrated long-run equilibrium is attained. I denotethe corresponding values by an upside-down hat. So, either λˇ2 ≥ 0 and ωˇ1 = ωˇ2, as infigure 7.6, or λˇ2 = 0 and ωˇ1 ≥ ωˇ2, as in figure 9.6; see (7.11d). If κ = 0, there exists ananalytical solution; see section 9.2.2. If κ ∈ (0,∞), a solution is derived numerically bysolving (7.10–11) with lˇM2 := 0 and an otherwise endogenous labor distribution.
41 There can exist two types of partially concentrated long-run equilibria, one with weak concentration that isstable and one with strong (but partial) concentration that is unstable, if τ < τb. See appendix B.2.3.2.
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I define ωˇ := ωˇ1 ≥ ωˇ2 as the welfare level of all households in the fully concentratedlong-run equilibrium. To establish this equilibrium’s sustainability, I define
θ := ωˇˇωM2 (7.28)
with θ|τ=1 = 1. To be sustainable, it must hold that θ ≥ 1. Otherwise, there is an incentivefor households to switch to the periphery’s otherwise nonexistent manufacturing industry. Ifthere is an analytical solution to the equilibrium, this test must be applied; see section 9.2.2.Though, a numerical solution can only yield a θ ≥ 1 due to (7.10g).Tracking the path of the transition point while continuing with the successive increasesin the transport cost, as illustrated by the gray dashed lines in figure 7.7, one finds thathouseholds in the periphery are not necessarily worse off at the transition point than thosein the center. So, full concentration is not necessarily sustainable. Since dθ/dτ|τ=1 > 0,it is at low levels of the transport cost as θ ≥ 1. Though, there typically exists a level ofthe transport cost called the “sustain point”, τs > 1, with θ|τ=τs = 1 and dθ/dτ|τ=τs < 0.If it exists, then full concentration is unsustainable at at least some — but typically all —levels of τ > τs; see figure 7.8. There is no analytical solution to the sustain point, thoughit can be determined numerically by establishing that the transition point has to coincidewith the fully concentrated long-run equilibrium. Calculating the positive transport cost,τ > 1, and the labor distribution from which it follows that ωˇ = ωˇM2 ⇔ θ = 1, yields thesustain point, if it exists; see figure 7.7.42 Graphical depictions of θ as a function of τ canbe found in section 8.3 and section 9.2.2. If κ = 0, this function is (9.12).
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Figure 7.7 Short-run equilibria at the sustain point (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4, σ = 8,τ = τs ≈ 1.74)
42 At τ = τs, the fully concentrated long-run equilibrium is half stable and half unstable. The economy returnsto this equilibrium if there is an exogenous migration shock toward the center. Yet, it transitions to symmetryif there is migration toward the periphery. This is why I use a circle in figure 7.7 for this very equilibrium.
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Figure 7.8 Short-run equilibria with stable dispersion (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4, σ = 8,τ = 2)
If κ = 0, a sustain point does not necessarily exist. Though, if it does, there always is atransport cost threshold above the sustain point, τ ′s > τs, above which full concentration issustainable as θ ≥ 1; i.e., θ|τ=τ ′s = 1 and dθ/dτ|τ=τ ′s > 0. See section 9.2.2.
7.4.3 Dispersion vs. concentration B.2.3.2
There is an important qualification in regards to the long-run equilibria that exist withinsome interval of the transport cost below the break point. The transition to agglomerationdoes not need to be subcritical, although it usually is. There can also be a supercriticaltransition into partial concentration with a subsequent leap from partial to full concentrationas the former ceases to be sustainable. I disregard the possibility of a partially concentratedlong-run equilibrium’s stability for four reasons. First, such a case is unlikely to appear.Second, if it does appear anyway, the break point and the sustain point are usually very highso that the economy is agglomerated given a realistic level of the transport cost. Third, thewelfare analysis explained hereafter does not apply. Fourth, the transport cost thresholdsare sensitive to changes in the parameters. See appendix B.2.3.2.Only considering subcritical transitions, any constellation of long-run equilibria essen-tially looks like that of figure 7.3. While all the households that decide during the transitionto move to the center base their decisions on the potential gains in welfare which this bringsfor themselves, they do not consider the impact of their actions on the welfare of others,whether it is the people in the region of origin or the people in the destination region.Hence, the transition might or might not have a mutually beneficial outcome. This is to saythat it remains to be determined whether a higher welfare for all can be brought about byreducing the transport cost to below the break point.
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I compare the respective welfare levels under full concentration and dispersion by using
χ := ωˇω (7.29)
with χ |τ=1 = 1. Since dχ/dτ|τ=1 > 0, concentration exhibits a higher welfare level thandispersion at low values of the transport cost as χ ≥ 1. Yet, there typically exists a thresholdof the transport cost called the “utility switch”, τu > 1, with χ |τ=τu = 1 and dχ/dτ|τ=τu < 0.If it exists, then full concentration exhibits a lower welfare level than dispersion at at leastsome — but typically all — levels of τ > τu as χ < 1. There is no analytical solution to theutility switch, though it can be determined numerically. Calculating the positive transportcost, τ > 1, and the labor distribution from which it follows that ωˇ = ω ⇔ χ = 1, yieldsthe utility switch, if it exists. Graphical depictions of χ as a function of τ can be found insection 8.3 and section 9.2.2. If κ = 0, this function is (9.13).If κ = 0, a utility switch does not necessarily exist. Though, if it does, there might be atransport cost threshold above the utility switch, τ ′u > τu, above which full concentration isadvantageous as χ ≥ 1; i.e., χ |τ=τ ′u = 1 and dχ/dτ|τ=τ ′u > 0.43 See section 9.2.3.
7.5 Wider impact
Comparing the break point to the utility switch, the distinction goes as follows. If τu < τb,there is a negative wider impact because full concentration — which is what the economytransitions to — provides a lower welfare level at the break point than dispersion. If τb < τu,there is a positive wider impact, as in figure 7.1 and figure 7.3. When the transport costdecreases and eventually falls below the break point, the economy switches to concentration,thereby increasing the welfare of all households. Though, this is just an example, and I canjust as easily find an example of a negative wider impact, e.g., that of figure 9.2. Therefore, Ihave demonstrated that, within the framework presented above, the sign of the wider impactis ambiguous.Even within the distinct cases presented below, the sign of the wider impact is ambiguous.In section 8.3 and section 9.3, for κ = 1 and κ = 0, respectively, I calculate parameterconstellations that yield a zero wider impact. From these results, one can infer the sign ofthe wider impact at other parameter constellations. Besides, I calculate two examples eachfor given values of σ which comprehend the values of the break point and the signs of thewider impact at different constellations of the remaining parameters.
43 Since the fully concentrated long-run equilibrium does not exist if τ ∈ (τs, τ ′s), it follows for the utility switchand its reversal point that τu, τ ′u 6∈ (τs, τ ′s).
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Cobb–Douglas case B.3
This distinct case is not quite as tractable as that of chapter 9, but it requires far fewer con-siderations concerning the parameters and the types of solutions to the long-run equilibria.Compared to the base model, it has the advantage of an analytical solution to the symmetricequilibrium. Section 8.3 demonstrates the evaluation method of the welfare effect, which isalso applied in section 9.3. The sign of the wider impact is shown to be ambiguous even asone confines the base model to this distinct case.The technology of the A-sector is of the Cobb–Douglas type, with η ∈ (0, 1) being theconstant cost share of labor so that 1− η is the cost share of land. As η suffices to adjustthe input intensities, I set γ := 1. Land and labor are imperfect substitutes in agriculture,with an elasticity of substitution of one. Since the figures in chapter 7 are calculated forκ = 1, they specifically apply to the Cobb–Douglas case.
8.1 Agriculture
The A-sector of region r collectively produces the amount given by (7.4b):
Ar = (lAr )η br1−η . (8.1)
Cost minimization yields constant cost shares as
MRTSlb = η1− η brlAr != wArRr ;
cf. (7.5a). In equilibrium, with br = 1, PA := 1 and the production function (8.1), the factorprices follow from the zero profit condition, which is wAr lAr + Rrbr = PAAr , as
Rrbr = (1− η)PAAr ⇒ Rr = (1− η)(lAr )η (8.2a)
wAr lAr = ηPAAr ⇒ wAr = η (lAr )η−1 . (8.2b)
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8.2 General equilibriumB.3.1
The systems of equations (7.10–11) yield the short-run and long-run equilibria. Though, therent and the agricultural wage rate (7.10a–b) need to be replaced by (8.2). Since this wagerate approaches infinity as the agricultural labor supply approaches zero, there always areworkers in region r’s agriculture if λr > 0, and wr = wAr ; see page 71. Calculating thedemand rather than inverse demand for agricultural labor (8.2b), and substituting this intothe inverse demand for land (8.2a), yields
lAr = ( ηwr
) 11−η (8.3a)
Rr = (1− η)( ηwr
) η1−η . (8.3b)
These can be used to conflate the short-run system of equations (7.10); see appendix B.3.1.As opposed to the dispersed equilibrium described hereafter, there is no analytical solutionto the fully concentrated long-run equilibrium; section 7.4.2 and section 7.4.3 apply.
8.2.1 DispersionB.3.1.1
From (7.17) with (7.12c–e) and (8.3) follows
δ ≡ 1− (1− η) (1− µ) , (8.4)
which is greater than both η and µ, but less than unity. The equilibrium values follow from(7.18–20) with (8.4) and can be found in appendix B.3.1.1.The differentials of the equations are given by (7.21–22), where (7.21b) is wˆ = (η − 1) lˆA,and (7.24) is ψ ≡ 1− η1− η 1− µµ 1σ − 1 . (8.5)The impact of immigration on welfare under symmetry, ωˆ/λˆ, is (7.23) with (8.4–5).With a prohibitive transport cost, the impact is (7.26) with (8.4–5):
limZ→1 ωˆˆλ = 1σ − 1
(δ − (η + σ (1− η)) η2 (1− µ)η + µ (1− η)2
) .
If and only if this is negative, the no–black–hole condition holds and dispersion is stablefor a sufficiently high transport cost. I.e., the no–black–hole condition is
σ > σnbh := 1 + µ η + δ (1− η)2η2 (1− δ) , (8.6)
with σnbh > 1. If this holds, a break point exists as given by (7.27) with (8.4–5). Figure 8.1
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is an example of a violated no–black–hole condition, and figure 8.2 etc. are examples ofa no–black–hole condition that is fulfilled. The line representing immigration’s impact onwelfare as a function of the transport cost either intersects the zero level or forever continuesabove it.
8.3 Wider impact B.3.2
A numerical calculation for constant values of η and µ, but varying values of σ , suffices toshow that the sign of the wider impact is ambiguous and to explain the evaluation method.This includes the derivation of the order of the transport cost thresholds, first and foremostthe break point, τb, and the utility switch, τu. Examples of the different types of resultsare listed in table 8.1. These include the corresponding values of χb := χ |τ=τb , i.e., thewelfare ratio between full concentration and dispersion at the break point. The results areillustrated by plotting ωˆ/λˆ (7.23), θ (7.28) and χ (7.29) over τ .
η µ σ Thresholds χb Wider impact Figures0.7 0.4 4.3 τu < τs n/a n/a 8.10.7 0.4 4.52 τu < τs < τb n/a n/a0.7 0.4 4.53 τu < τb < τs n/a n/a B.10.7 0.4 5 τu < τb < τs < 1 negative 8.2 B.40.7 0.4 ≈ 5.41 τb = τu < τs = 1 zero 8.3 B.50.7 0.4 8 τb < τu < τs > 1 positive 8.4 B.6 7.3
Table 8.1 Transport cost thresholds and the sign of the wider impact (γ = 1, κ = 1, σnbh ≈ 4.51)PSfrag replacements
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Figure 8.1 Transport cost thresholds with no break point (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 4.3 < σnbh ≈ 4.51)
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Figure 8.2 Transport cost thresholds with a negative wider impact (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 5)PSfrag replacements
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Figure 8.3 Transport cost thresholds with a zero wider impact (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = σbu ≈ 5.41)PSfrag replacements
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Figure 8.4 Transport cost thresholds with a positive wider impact (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 8)
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According to (8.6), the no–black–hole condition is fulfilled if and only if σ > σnbh ≈ 4.51,given that η = 0.7 and µ = 0.4. With the first example of table 8.1, this condition is violatedand a break point does not exist, which is illustrated in figure 8.1. If σ is larger — butonly slightly larger — than σnbh, as with the subsequent two examples, a break point doesexist which is either higher or slightly lower than the sustain point. Hence, the transitionto full concentration is not catastrophic, and the welfare assessment can not be applied;see appendix B.2.3.2. Given a sufficiently large σ , the break point is sufficiently lower thanthe sustain point for the transition to be catastrophic. Successive increases in σ decreaseall transport cost thresholds, but they change their order in that they move the break pointnot just past the sustain point, but eventually past the utility switch.Figure 8.2 illustrates the fourth example of table 8.1. It exhibits a break point above theutility switch; so, χb < 1 and the wider impact is negative. If σ is sufficiently large, as withthe sixth example illustrated by figure 8.4, the break point is below the utility switch; so,χb > 1 and the wider impact is positive. Thus, there exists a threshold of σ at which thetwo transport cost thresholds are equal so that there is a zero wider impact, i.e., χb = 1.See figure 8.3, which illustrates the fifth example, with a σ = σbu := {σ |τb = τu} ≈ 5.41and a τbu := {τb|τb = τu} ≈ 2.33. See appendix B.3.2 for illustrations of these examples’welfare effects as a consequence of a transport cost reduction. This goes to show that thesign of the wider impact is ambiguous. Given the values of η and µ, the wider impact isnegative — if applicable — if σ ∈ (σnbh, σbu). It is positive if σ ∈ (σbu,∞).An overview of the parameter constellations that yield a zero wider impact is given byfigure 8.5. The solid lines delineate the combinations of η and µ that yield no wider impactif σ is of a certain value. The dashed lines delineate the combinations of η and µ, withσ = σbu, that yield a break point and a utility switch of a certain value. The sign of thewider impact at other parameter constellations can be inferred as follows. For instance, ifσ = 8, there is a positive wider impact at the combinations of η and µ below the line ofσbu = 8 as σ > σbu. The sixth example of table 8.1 (η = 0.7, µ = 0.4) is one of these. Atthe combinations of η and µ above this line, there is a negative wider impact if the welfareassessment is applicable. At, say, η = 0.7 and µ = 0.56, there is a negative wider impact.At, say, η = 0.7 and µ = 0.6, the assessment is not applicable since σ < σnbh. Cf. figure 8.7.Generally speaking, τbu tends to be the lower, the higher σbu is. If σ > σbu, there is apositive wider impact at τb < τbu.The values of σbu and τbu in the upper area of figure 8.5 have not been computed becausethe no–black–hole condition yields very high values of σnbh, and σbu would be even higher.I defined rules for which values to compute. At any combination of η and µ, I compute σnbh.If σnbh < 60, I compute τb|σ=60; otherwise, the computation is aborted. This break point canbe seen as a lower bound on τbu because, if σbu < 60, then τbu > τb|σ=60. If τb|σ=60 > 5,the computation is aborted. After executing this computation of σbu and τbu for multiplecombinations of η and µ, the lines are drawn as contours.
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Figure 8.5 Parameter constellations giving rise to a zero wider impact (γ = 1, κ = 1)
Figure 8.6 and figure 8.7 assume given elasticities of substitution of σ = 5 and σ = 8,respectively. The dotted lines outline the constellations of η and µ below them that yieldsome break point as σ > σnbh. The solid lines delineate the parameter constellations thatyield a break point of a certain value. The dashed lines delineate the constellations of nowider impact at τ = τb. Below these lines, the wider impact is positive.The larger σ is, the smaller µ is and the more medium η is, the more likely it is thatthe no–black–hole condition is fulfilled, the lower is the break point (if it exists), the morelikely it is that the economy is spatially dispersed, and the more likely it is that the widerimpact is positive.
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Figure 8.6 Sign of the wider impact with a low elasticity of substitution (γ = 1, κ = 1, σ = 5)
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Figure 8.7 Sign of the wider impact with a high elasticity of substitution (γ = 1, κ = 1, σ = 8)
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Chapter 9
Limitational case B.4
This distinct case is more tractable than that of chapter 8. There are analytical solutions,e.g., that to the fully concentrated long-run equilibrium, that otherwise do not exist. Though,they require considerations concerning the parameters and the types of solutions to thelong-run equilibria. Section 9.3 applies the evaluation of the welfare effect demonstratedin section 8.3. Again, the sign of the wider impact is shown to be ambiguous.The A-sector technology is of the Leontief type as the elasticity of substitution is κ = 0;so, agricultural labor and land are perfect complements. In addition to one unit of land,the agricultural firms employ γ units of labor per unit of output. Only if γ ∈ (0, 1− µ), thewelfare assessment can be applicable; see section 9.2.1. The parameter η is of no relevancebecause it is not contained in the Leontief–type production function.
9.1 Agriculture
The whole of region r’s agricultural industry produces the amount given by (7.4c):
Ar = min{lAr /γ, br} .
Cost minimization yields a relative factor price of
wArRr != MRTSlb =
∞ for lAr /γ < br0 for lAr /γ > br ; (9.1)
cf. (7.5a). The zero profit condition, Rr + γwAr = PA, with (9.1), br = 1 and PA := 1 yields
Rr =
0 for lAr < γ1 for lAr > γ
wAr =
1/γ for lAr < γ0 for lAr > γ .
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At lAr /γ = br , the production function is nondifferentiable, and MRTSlb is indeterminable.Though, the factor prices are determinable in spatial equilibrium.
9.2 General equilibriumB.4.1
The short-run and long-run systems of equations which are to be implemented are (7.10–11)with the A-sector factor prices (7.10a–b) replaced by
Rr = 1− γwAr (9.2a)
wAr = 1/γ for lAr < γwAr ∈ [min{wMr , 1/γ} , 1/γ] for lAr = γwAr = 0 for lAr > γ .
(9.2b)
If lAr = γ, an intraregional distribution is in equilibrium if wAr = wMr while lMr ≥ 0 or ifwAr ≥ wMr while lMr = 0; see (7.10g). The vertical sections in figure 9.1 exemplify the latter.The wage does not exceed 1/γ, as Rr is nonnegative. The case of lAr > γ is irrelevant ingeneral equilibrium since wMr is generally positive.
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Figure 9.1 Short-run equilibria with stable full concentration (γ = 0.45, κ = 0, µ = 0.5, σ = 6,τ = 1.4 < τR ≈ 1.47 < τb ≈ 1.68)
In figure 9.1, the long-run equilibria — both dispersed and fully concentrated — exhibitamounts of agricultural labor of lAr = lAs = γ. Figure 9.2 depicts such long-run equilibriafor varying levels of the transport cost. Yet, both types of long-run equilibria can insteadexhibit an amount of agricultural labor below γ in one region and/or the other so that landis abundant and free. Either way, there are algebraic solutions to both types of long-runequilibria, and hence to θ and χ . So, all transport cost thresholds can readily be derived,including two thresholds that are unique to the limitational case.
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Figure 9.2 Long-run equilibria with a varying transport cost (γ = 0.3, κ = 0, µ = 0.4, σ = 6,τR ≈ 13.33, τλ ≈ 43.66)
9.2.1 Dispersion B.4.1.1
From (7.17) with (7.12c–e) and (9.2) follows
δ ≡

µ1− γ for γ + µ ≤ 1 D1 (9.3a)1 for γ + µ ≥ 1 D2 . (9.3b)
Either γ + µ ≤ 1⇒ δ ≡ µ/ (1− γ) ≤ 1 so that lA = γ and R ≥ 0, which is the solution tothe dispersed equilibrium denoted by D1, or γ + µ ≥ 1 ⇒ δ ≡ 1 so that lA = 1 − µ ≤ γand R = 0, which is D2. If and only if the income share spent on the A-good, 1 − µ, isgreater than γ, the labor share employed in agriculture is γ and the rent is positive. Theequilibrium values that follow from (7.18–19) with (9.3) can be found in appendix B.4.1.1.The respective welfare levels follow from (7.20), (7.19c) and (9.3). In D1, it is
ω = ( 11− µ
)1−µ ((1− γµ
)σ (1 + φ)) µσ−1 . (9.4a)
In D2, it is ω = (1γ
)1−µ (1 + φ) µσ−1 . (9.4b)
The derivatives at symmetry of the system of equations are (7.21a), (7.21c–e) and (7.22)with lˆA = 0 for D1 and wˆ = 0 for D2, and (7.24) is{ ψ ≡ 1 for γ + µ ≤ 1 D1 (9.5a)ψ → −∞ for γ + µ > 1 D2 . (9.5b)
The impact of immigration on welfare under symmetry, ωˆ/λˆ, is (7.23) with (9.3) and (9.5).
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If γ + µ > 1, the impact is ωˆ/λˆ = µ/ (σ − 1) > 0 with any Z > 0. Hence, a break pointdoes not exist because dispersion is not stable at any level of the transport cost, and thewelfare assessment is not applicable with D2, irrespective of σ . With D1, though, a breakpoint might exist. Given a prohibitive transport cost, the impact is
limZ→1 ωˆˆλ = δ
( 1σ − 1 − γ21− γ − µ
) ;
cf. (7.26). This is negative, i.e., the no–black–hole condition is fulfilled, if and only if
σ > σnbh := 1 + 1− γ − µγ2 , (9.6)
with σnbh ≥ 1. If this holds true, a break point exists, which is
τb = ( (1 + (1− γ) (3− γ)) (σ − 1) + 1− γ + µγ2 (σ − 1)− (1− γ) + µ
) 1σ−1 ; (9.7)
cf. (7.27). See appendix B.4.1.1.
9.2.2 ConcentrationB.4.1.2
It exists an analytical solution to the fully concentrated long-run equilibrium. From (7.10c–j)and (9.2) with lˇM2 := 0 follow lˇA1 + lˇA2 + lˇM1 = 2 and
yˇ1 = 1 + (2− γ) wˇ1 − γwˇ22 (9.8a)yˇ2 = 1 + (2− γ) wˇ2 − γwˇ12 (9.8b)Yˇ1 = (lˇA1 + lˇM1 ) yˇ1 (9.8c)Yˇ2 = lˇA2 yˇ2 (9.8d)
PˇM1 = ( µˇlM1
) 1σ−1 wˇ1 (9.8e)
PˇM2 = ( µˇlM1
) 1σ−1 τwˇ1 = τPˇM1 (9.8f)wˇ1 = 1/γ for lˇA1 < γwˇ1 ∈ (0, 1/γ] for lˇA1 = γ (9.8g)wˇ2 = 1/γ for lˇA2 < γwˇ2 ∈ (0, 1/γ] for lˇA2 = γ (9.8h)
wˇ1 = (PˇM1 ) σ−1σ (Yˇ1 + Yˇ2)1/σ . (9.8i)
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The wage that manufacturing firms in the periphery would pay, if there were any, followsfrom (7.10c) with (9.8f):
wˇM2 = (PˇM1 ) σ−1σ (φYˇ1 + Yˇ2/φ)1/σ . (9.8j)
Welfare in the center must equal that in the periphery if λˇ2 > 0 ⇔ lˇA2 > 0. From (7.11c)with (9.8f) follows ωˇ1 = ωˇ2 ⇔ τµyˇ1 = yˇ2. If λˇ2 = 0⇔ lˇA2 = 0, then ωˇ1 ≥ ωˇ2. See (7.11d).Adding up the regions’ aggregate incomes (9.8c–d) yields
Yˇ1 + Yˇ2 = 2 + (lˇA1 + lˇM1 − γ) wˇ1 − (γ − lˇA2) wˇ2 .
Substituting this and (9.8e) into the equation for the wage in the center (9.8i) yields
wˇ1 = 2−
(γ − lˇA2) wˇ2γ − lˇA1 + ((1− µ) /µ) lˇM1 . (9.9a)The rent in the center follows from (9.2a):
Rˇ1 = γ − lˇA1 + ((1− µ) /µ) lˇM1 − γ
(2− (γ − lˇA2) wˇ2)γ − lˇA1 + ((1− µ) /µ) lˇM1 . (9.9b)If ωˇ2 = ωˇ1 ⇔ yˇ2 = τµyˇ1, then (9.8a–b) yield
wˇ2 = 2 (τµ − 1) + (2τµ − γ (τµ − 1)) wˇ12 + γ (τµ − 1) . (9.9c)
The rent in the periphery then follows from (9.2a):
Rˇ2 = 2− γ (τµ − 1 + (2τµ − γ (τµ − 1)) wˇ1)2 + γ (τµ − 1) . (9.9d)
There are four types of solutions to (9.8–9) to distinguish between; see appendix B.4.1.2for the equilibrium values. If γ/2 + µ ≤ 1, there are three possible solutions, depending onhow the transport cost relates to the thresholds
τR := (1 + 2γ 1− γ − µ1− γ + µ
)1/µ (9.10a)
τλ := (1 + 2γ 2 (1− µ)− γ2− γ
)1/µ , (9.10b)
with γ+ µ ≤ 1⇒ τR ≥ 1, γ/2 + µ ≤ 1⇒ τλ ≥ 1 and τR < τλ. If γ+ µ ≤ 1 and τ ∈ [1, τR ],the equilibrium exhibits lˇA1 = lˇA2 = γ and Rˇ1, Rˇ2 ≥ 0, which is the solution C1; see figure 9.1.If τ ∈ [τR , τλ], or τ ∈ [1, τλ] if γ+µ ≥ 1, the equilibrium exhibits lˇA1 = γ, lˇA2 ≤ γ, Rˇ1 ≥ 0 and
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Rˇ2 = 0, which is C2; see figure 9.3 and figure 9.5. If τ ∈ [τλ,∞), the equilibrium exhibitslˇA1 = γ, lˇA2 = 0, Rˇ1 ≥ 0 and Rˇ2 = 0, which is C3; see figure 9.6. Finally, if γ/2 + µ ≥ 1, theequilibrium exhibits lˇA1 ≤ γ, lˇA2 = 0 and Rˇ1 = Rˇ2 = 0 irrespective of τ , which is C4.The respective welfare levels follow from (7.11b–c). In C1, they are
ωˇ = 12 + γ (τµ − 1)
( 21− µ
)1−µ (2 (1− γ)µ
) µσσ−1 (9.11a)
ωˇM2 = τ−µ2 + γ (τµ − 1)
( 21− µ
)1−µ (2 (1− γ)µ
) µσσ−1
· [1− µ 2 + γ (τµ − 1)2 (1− γ)
(1− ( (2− γ) τ1−σ + γτµ+σ−12 + γ (τµ − 1)
)1/σ)] . (9.11b)
In C2, they are
ωˇ = 22− γ (τµ − 1)
( 2− γ (τµ − 1)2τµ − γ (τµ − 1) 1γ
)1−µ (2 2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1)2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1)
) µσ−1 (9.11c)
ωˇM2 = 2τ−µ2− γ (τµ − 1)
( 2− γ (τµ − 1)2τµ − γ (τµ − 1) 1γ
)1−µ (2 2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1)2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1)
) µσ−1
· 12
[[ (2− γ (τµ − 1))σ−12τµ − γ (τµ − 1)
(τ1−σ (2 (2µ + γ) + (4µ − γ2) (τµ − 1))
+ τµ+σ−1 (4 (1− µ)− γ (2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1))))]1/σ + γ (τµ − 1)] .
(9.11d)
In C3, they are
ωˇ = 12
( 11− µ
)1−µ (2− γµ
) µσσ−1 (9.11e)
ωˇ2 = 4 (1− µ)− γ22γ (2− γ) τµ
( 11− µ
)1−µ (2− γµ
) µσσ−1 (9.11f)
ωˇM2 = 2− γ − 2µ (1− φ1/σ)2 (2− γ) τµ
( 11− µ
)1−µ (2− γµ
) µσσ−1 (9.11g)
with ωˇ ≥ ωˇ2. In C4, also with ωˇ ≥ ωˇ2, they are
ωˇ = (1γ
)1−µ 2 µσ−1 (9.11h)
ωˇ2 = τ−µ (1γ
)1−µ 2 µσ−1 (9.11i)
ωˇM2 = τ−µ− σ−1σ (1γ
)1−µ 2 µσ−1 . (9.11j)
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Figure 9.3 Short-run equilibria with stable dispersion and full concentration I (γ = 0.45, κ = 0,µ = 0.5, σ = 6, τR ≈ 1.47 < τb ≈ 1.68 < τ = 2 < τs ≈ 2.55 < τλ ≈ 6.64)
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Figure 9.4 Short-run equilibria with stable dispersion (γ = 0.45, κ = 0, µ = 0.5, σ = 6,τR ≈ 1.47 < τs ≈ 2.55 < τ = 3 < τ ′s ≈ 4.18 < τλ ≈ 6.64)
A solution’s sustainability is verified by use of (7.28). For C1, (9.11a–b) yield
θ = τµ [1− µ 2 + γ (τµ − 1)2 (1− γ)
(1− ( (2− γ) τ1−σ + γτµ+σ−12 + γ (τµ − 1)
)1/σ)]−1 . (9.12a)
For C2, (9.11c–d) yield
θ = 2τµ [[ (2− γ (τµ − 1))σ−12τµ − γ (τµ − 1)
(τ1−σ (2 (2µ + γ) + (4µ − γ2) (τµ − 1))
+ τµ+σ−1 (4 (1− µ)− γ (2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1))))]1/σ + γ (τµ − 1)]−1 . (9.12b)
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For C3, (9.11e) and (9.11g) yield
θ = (2− γ) τµ2− γ − 2µ (1− φ1/σ) ≥ 1 . (9.12c)
For C4, (9.11h) and (9.11j) yield
θ = τµ+ σ−1σ ≥ 1 . (9.12d)
Figure 9.4 is the one example where there is no sustainable fully concentrated equilibrium.The kinks in the wiggle diagrams’ solid lines other than the transition points are due to theinitial emigration from the periphery’s A-sector in consequence of increased concentration.
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Figure 9.5 Short-run equilibria with stable dispersion and full concentration II (γ = 0.45, κ = 0,µ = 0.5, σ = 6, τR ≈ 1.47 < τs ≈ 2.55 < τ ′s ≈ 4.18 < τ = 5.5 < τλ ≈ 6.64)PSfrag replacements
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Figure 9.6 Short-run equilibria with stable dispersion and full concentration III (γ = 0.45, κ = 0,µ = 0.5, σ = 6, τ ′s ≈ 4.18 < τλ ≈ 6.64 < τ = 7)
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Since θ|τ=1 = 1 and dθ/dτ|τ=1 > 0, full concentration is sustainable at low values of τas θ ≥ 1; see appendix B.4.1.2. Since limτ→∞ θ =∞, full concentration is also sustainableat high levels of τ . Only maybe, it is unsustainable at medium levels of τ . If and only ifa sustain point, τs, exists, there also exists its reversal point, τ ′s, and there exists no fullyconcentrated long-run equilibrium at τ ∈ (τs, τ ′s) since (9.12) yields a θ < 1. Figure 9.7is an example where these thresholds exist, which belongs to the wiggle diagrams above.44In figure 9.8, these thresholds do not exist.
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Figure 9.7 Transport cost thresholds (γ = 0.45, κ = 0, µ = 0.5, σ = 6,τR ≈ 1.47 < τu ≈ 1.72 < τs ≈ 2.55 < τ ′s ≈ 4.18 < τλ ≈ 6.64)PSfrag replacements
χθ
4.4τλτ ′uτu1 Transport cost (τ)
Susta
in/we
lfare
curve
1
Figure 9.8 Transport cost thresholds with no sustain point (γ = 0.6, κ = 0, µ = 0.5, σ = 6.85,τu ≈ 2.98 < τ ′u ≈ 3.64 < τλ ≈ 3.81)
44 As opposed to the figures of section 8.3 for the Cobb–Douglas case, figure 9.7 displays θ and χ even wherea fully concentrated long-run equilibrium does not actually exist as θ < 1. This is just because, in theLeontief case, θ and χ at τ ∈ (τs, τ ′s) can actually be determined.
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9.2.3 Dispersion vs. concentrationB.4.1.3
Of the two solutions to the dispersed equilibrium and the four solutions to the fully concen-trated long-run equilibrium, there are six possible combinations, as summarized in table 9.1.The welfare ratio, χ , is (7.29) with ω (9.4) and ωˇ (9.11).
Dispersion Full concentration χγ + µ γ/2 + µ τR τλ τ
≤ 1 D1 ≥ 1 > 1 ∈ [1, τR ] C1 9.13a∈ [τR , τλ] C2 9.13b∈ [τλ,∞) C3 9.13c
≥ 1 D2 ≤ 1 ≥ 1 ∈ [1, τλ] C2 9.13d∈ [τλ,∞) C3 9.13e≥ 1 ∈ [1,∞) C4 9.13f
Table 9.1 Co-occurrences of dispersed and fully concentrated long-run equilibria (κ = 0)
If γ + µ ≤ 1, the dispersed equilibrium is D1. Also, τR ≥ 1, and there is one of threetypes of fully concentrated long-run equilibria. If τ ∈ [1, τR ], it is C1, and (9.4a) and (9.11a)yield
χ = 22 + γ (τµ − 1)
( 21 + φ
) µσ−1 . (9.13a)
If τ ∈ [τR , τλ], it is C2, and (9.4a) and (9.11c) yield
χ = 22− γ (τµ − 1)
( 2− γ (τµ − 1)2τµ − γ (τµ − 1) 1− µγ
)1−µ
· (( 2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1)2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1)
)( µ1− γ
)σ 21 + φ
) µσ−1 . (9.13b)
If τ ∈ [τλ,∞), it is C3, and (9.4a) and (9.11e) yield
χ = (12
)1−µ (( 2− γ2 (1− γ)
)σ 21 + φ
) µσ−1 . (9.13c)
If γ+µ ≥ 1, the dispersed equilibrium is D2. Since this equilibrium is generally unstable,a break point does not exist, and the assessment of the wider impact is not applicable.However, if γ/2 + µ ≤ 1, then τλ ≥ 1, and there is one of two types of fully concentratedlong-run equilibria. If τ ∈ [1, τλ], it is C2, and (9.4b) and (9.11c) yield
χ = 22− γ (τµ − 1)
( 2− γ (τµ − 1)2τµ − γ (τµ − 1)
)1−µ ( 2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1)2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1) 21 + φ
) µσ−1 . (9.13d)
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If τ ∈ [τλ,∞), it is C3, and (9.4b) and (9.11e) yield
χ = ( γ2 (1− µ)
)1−µ ((2− γ2µ
)σ 21 + φ
) µσ−1 . (9.13e)
If γ/2 + µ ≥ 1, the fully concentrated long-run equilibrium is C4, irrespective of the level ofthe transport cost, and (9.4b) and (9.11h) yield
χ = ( 21 + φ
) µσ−1 ≥ 1 . (9.13f)
Since χ |τ=1 = 1 and dχ/dτ|τ=1 > 0, full concentration exhibits a higher welfare levelthan dispersion at low values of τ as χ ≥ 1. If limτ→∞ χ ≤ 1, a utility switch, τu, exists,yet not its reversal point, τ ′u, and full concentration exhibits a lower welfare level thandispersion at τ ∈ (τu,∞) since (9.13) yields a χ < 1; see figure 9.7. If limτ→∞ χ > 1, autility switch might exist. If and only if it does, τ ′u also exists, and χ < 1 at τ ∈ (τu, τ ′u).In figure 9.8, these thresholds exist. See appendix B.4.1.3.
9.3 Wider impact
Like in section 8.3, it suffices to do a numerical calculation for constant values of γ and µ,but varying values of σ , to show that the sign of the wider impact is ambiguous. Examplesof the different types of results are listed in table 9.2. Provided that γ = 0.3 and µ = 0.4,a break point exists if and only if σ > σnbh = 13/3; see (9.6). The transport cost thresholdsfollow from τb (9.7), θ (9.12) and χ (9.13).
γ µ σ Thresholds χb Wider impact Figures0.3 0.4 1.5 n/a n/a0.3 0.4 2.5 τu n/a n/a0.3 0.4 4 τu < τs n/a n/a0.3 0.4 5 τu < τs < τb n/a n/a0.3 0.4 6 τu < τb < τs < 1 negative 9.20.3 0.4 ≈ 8.48 τb = τu < τs = 1 zero0.3 0.4 10 τb < τu < τs > 1 positive
Table 9.2 Transport cost thresholds and the sign of the wider impact (κ = 0, σnbh = 13/3)
An overview of the parameter constellations that yield a zero wider impact is depicted infigure 9.9. The straight dotted line outlines the combinations of γ and µ above it that yieldthe dispersed equilibrium D2 which generally has no break point, whatever the value of σ .The solid lines delineate the combinations of γ and µ that yield no wider impact if σ is of acertain value. The dashed lines delineate the combinations of γ and µ, with σ = σbu, that
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yield a break point and a utility switch of a certain value. It turns out that these thresholdscan only be equal with the fully concentrated equilibrium C1; i.e., τbu < τR . The reasonis that, as opposed to the Cobb–Douglas case, a utility switch does not necessarily exist.The curved dotted line outlines the combinations of γ and µ above it that yield D1 but noσbu and τbu. If, say, σ = 10, the wider impact is positive at the combinations of γ and µabove the line of σbu = 10 since σ > σbu; see the seventh example of table 9.2 (γ = 0.3,µ = 0.4) and compare figure 9.11. With the fifth example, there is a negative wider impactsince σ = 6 < σbu. Like with the Cobb–Douglas case, τbu tends to be the lower, the higherσbu is. If σ > σbu, there is a positive wider impact at τb < τbu.
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Figure 9.9 Parameter constellations giving rise to a zero wider impact (κ = 0)
Figure 9.10 and figure 9.11 assume given elasticities of σ = 8 and σ = 10, respectively.The straight dotted lines outline the constellations of γ and µ above them that yield D2which generally has no break point. The curved dotted lines in the bottom left-hand cornersoutline the constellations to their right that yield some break point. The solid lines delineatethe constellations that yield a break point of a certain value. The black dashed lines outlinethe constellations to their left that yield no fully concentrated long-run equilibrium at thebreak point as θb := θ|τ=τb < 1. The gray dashed lines outline the constellations abovethem that yield a positive wider impact at τ = τb. The gray dotted lines delineate theconstellations of τb = τR .
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Figure 9.10 Sign of the wider impact with a low elasticity of substitution (κ = 0, σ = 8)
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Figure 9.11 Sign of the wider impact with a high elasticity of substitution (κ = 0, σ = 10)
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The larger σ and µ are, the more likely it is that the no–black–hole condition is fulfilled,the lower is the break point (if it exists), the more likely it is that the economy is dispersed,and the more likely it is that the wider impact is positive. The larger γ is, the more likelyit is that the no–black–hole condition is fulfilled, and the lower is the break point. Withregards to µ, this is the other way round from the Cobb–Douglas case; see section 8.3.
End of part II 
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Conclusion
I have demonstrated, as others have before me, that there exist wider impacts as a conse-quence of a transport infrastructure investment that result from imperfect competition in thewider economy or from an agglomeration externality. Whether the wider impacts are of aconsiderable scale, is something I do not attempt to assess. What I can say is that the signsof the wider impacts are ambiguous. Strictly speaking, I would even be very cautious toconjecture which sign is by and large the more probable one. Presupposing a positive sign,and maybe even a considerable scale, whether for imperfect competition or agglomeration,would constitute a considerable bias in transport appraisal.I agree with what seems to be consensus anyway, that there probably could not be es-tablished any simple rules of thumb for the evaluation of transport projects’ wider impacts(Vickerman, 2008a, p. 80). It rather appears necessary to conduct project–based assess-ments, maybe as addenda to conventional cost–benefit analyses. In line with my reluctanceto predict the wider impacts’ potential scale, I am just as reluctant to predict whether thewider impacts are significant enough to justify their ex ante assessment.
10.1 Imperfect competition I
If an imperfectly competitive market’s equilibrium quantity is affected by a transport scheme— whether directly or indirectly — this induces a wider impact. As the mark-up is positive,i.e., as the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay is above the marginal cost, the equilibriumquantity is below the socially optimal level at which the marginal willingness to pay equalsthe marginal cost. If the quantity is increased, the market induces positive welfare effects,and if the quantity is decreased, it induces negative welfare effects. The price quantifies themarginal overall impact as it represents the consumers’ willingness to pay for an additionalunit of the good. The marginal cost quantifies the marginal direct impact as it representsthe resources reallocated to this industry — possibly from transportation. The mark-up thusquantifies the marginal wider impact. For a market whose marginal cost of transportationis directly affected by the scheme, partial equilibrium analysis suggests that the quantityis increased and that the welfare effects are thus positive.
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In a general equilibrium framework with multiple industries, the outcome of a transportscheme is typically such that some quantities are increased while others are decreased. Forthe net wider impact to be positive, the quantities of goods with positive mark-ups need tobe increased, while the decreases need to be of the quantities of goods with relatively lowor even zero mark-ups. An increase in the demand for any normal good can be due to adecrease in the good’s price, which is in turn due to a reduction in the mark-up and/or themarginal cost of transportation. Though, the latter comes at the cost of running the scheme,and the scheme is financed by taxing the households. The higher the scheme’s costs are,the lower is the households’ disposable income, and the lower is the households’ demandfor any normal good. In other words, running the scheme absorbs some of the economy’slimited resources. Yet, it does so in order to reduce the costs of transportation. The moreefficient it is at doing this, the more resources remain available for the production of thevarious goods. This entire reallocation of the resources, which is triggered by the scheme,is in accordance with the quantity shifts described above.The total impact on the industries’ profits is the combined impact via changes in themark-ups and the quantities. The latter by itself is equal to the wider impact. Providedthat the mark-ups are exogenous, the wider impact is equal to the total impact on profits.Provided that the profits are zero, the wider impact is equal to the impact on the profits viachanges in the mark-ups, but with a reversed sign. These changes in the mark-ups thenrepresent the impact on average costs, and the wider impact represents the benefits fromeconomies of scale.If the costs of the scheme are such that there is no direct impact, then the wider impactis equal to the overall impact. The marginal overall impact is positive if there is a positivecorrelation between the mark-up factors atop the marginal costs and the resource shifts.I.e., it is positive if resources are shifted from industries with below–average mark-up factorstoward industries with above–average mark-up factors.An economy with monopolistically competitive industries yields demand/resource shiftsthat are positively correlated with the mark-up factors and the transportation intensities.A transportation intensity is a good’s marginal cost reduction as a fraction of the price.The marginal wider impact is positive if there is a positive correlation between the mark-upfactors and the transportation intensities. I.e., it is positive if the industries with the above–average mark-up factors are the ones with the above–average transportation intensities.With the potential suppliers of an industry differing with regards to their marginal costsof transportation, a scheme can make the costs converge, leading to an increase in thenumber of suppliers. Firm entry has two effects on the marginal wider impact. There is apositive effect if the decline of the price is accelerated through enhanced competition. Thereis a negative effect since the entrant has higher transport costs than the incumbent firms.If the incumbents deter other firms from entering, e.g., by means of predatory pricing, themarginal wider impact is both positive and higher than without entry deterrence.
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10.2 Agglomeration II
The agglomeration of economic activity can yield benefits due to, say, economies of scale,enhanced competition or avoidance of transport costs. Yet, it can also yield costs due to, say,scarce resources. Moreover, agglomeration in one region must go along with deglomerationin another region if there is a fixed number of agents, as in a general equilibrium framework.When a transport cost reduction brings about a redistribution of economic activity, theremaybe is a net benefit for one region and a net loss for another region. There is generallyeither a net benefit or a net loss for the economy as a whole.This ambiguity of the sign of the wider impact is what I have demonstrated within a singleNew Economic Geography model. While the approach by Tabuchi (1998) also yields anambiguous sign, the ones by Pflüger & Südekum (2008b) and Ottaviano et al. (2002) yieldnegative signs.In my model, the sign of the wider impact is negatively correlated with the households’love for variety regarding the manufactures, of which the elasticity of substitution of thehouseholds’ preferences regarding the varieties of the manufactures is an inverse measure.The stronger the love for variety is, the more likely it is that the wider impact is negative.But the stronger the love for variety is, the stronger are the economy’s centripetal forces.Given the level of the transport cost, the economy is already concentrated given a sufficientlystrong love for variety. The economy is dispersed given a sufficiently weak love for variety;so, a successive transport cost reduction eventually triggers a transition to concentration.The weaker the love for variety is, the more likely it is that the wider impact is positive.
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Imperfect competition I
A.1 Notation
A bar with any parameter or variable, e.g., u¯, denotes the corresponding value in an arbitraryreference situation for the purpose of the welfare assessment.
Symbol Meaningai Average costs of industry ic Marginal cost of production of industry 1ci Marginal cost of production of industry icj Marginal cost of production of firm jCS Consumer surplus on the transport marketd Subscript for the domestic firm of industry 1D,Di Direct impact (from industry i) on the welfare of the transport userse Subscript for the foreign firm of industry 1e(·) Expenditure functionf Fixed costs per firm of industry 1f (·) Adaptation of the expenditure functionfi Fixed costs per firm of industry iFi Aggregate fixed costs of industry ii Subscript for the industries/goodsI, Ii Overall impact (from industry i) on the welfare of the householdj Subscript for a firm or an industry/good other than iL Endowment with labor and labor supplym Total marginal cost of industry 1’s monopolistmd Total marginal cost of industry 1’s domestic firmme Total marginal cost of industry 1’s foreign firmmi Total marginal cost of industry imj Total marginal cost of firm jmˆ Average of total marginal costs of industry 1’s duopolistsm˜ Total marginal cost of industry 1’s monopolist prior to the scheme
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Symbol Meaningm˜d Total marginal cost of industry 1’s domestic firm prior to the schemem˜e Total marginal cost of industry 1’s foreign firm prior to the schemem˜i Total marginal cost of industry i prior to the schemem˜j Total marginal cost of firm j prior to the schemem Vector of all industries’ total marginal costsni, ni(·) Number of firms/varieties of industry/good iN Number of industries/goodsp, p(·) Consumer price of good 1pd(·) Function of the consumer price of good 1 on the domestic marketpe(·) Function of the consumer price of good 1 on the export marketpi, pi(·) Consumer price of (any variety of) good ip,p(·) Vector of all goods’ consumer pricesPi Consumer price index of good iP Vector of all goods’ consumer price indicess(·) Sub–utility function regarding good 1 with quasi-linear preferencesS, S(·), Si Lump-sum tax and costs of the scheme (attributed to industry i)t Reduction in the marginal transport cost of industry 1’s monopolisttd Reduction in the marginal transport cost of industry 1’s domestic firmte Reduction in the marginal transport cost of industry 1’s foreign firmti Reduction in the marginal transport cost of industry itj Reduction in the marginal transport cost of firm jtˆ, tˆ(·) Average reduction in the marginal transport costs of industry 1’s duopolistsu Utility of the householdu(·) Utility functionUi(·) Sub–utility function regarding good i with two–tier preferencesv (·) Indirect utility functionw(·) Adaptation of the indirect utility functionW,Wi Wider impact (from industry i) on the welfare of the householdxd Quantity of good 1 by domestic firmxe Quantity of good 1 by foreign firmxi Quantity of any variety of good ixi(·) Marshallian demand function of any variety of good ix˜i Quantity of any variety per unit of good iX Quantity of good 1X (·) Demand function of good 1Xi Quantity of good iXi(·) Marshallian demand function of good iX ′i Impact on the quantity of good i
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Symbol MeaningXhi (·) Hicksian demand function of good iXˆ ′ Average impact on the quantitiesX´ ′ Relative impact on the quantity of an average gooody, y(·) Nominal disposable income of the householdz Quantity of the numeraire goodz(·) Marshallian demand function of the numeraire goodαi Expenditure share of good iγi Constant with the demand for good i in long-run equilibriumδ Disposable income’s share of earned incomeε Price elasticity of (market) demand for good 1εi Price elasticity of demand for good iη Constant with the expenditure function and the indirect utility functionλ Export share of industry 1’s duopolistsµ Absolute mark-up of industry 1’s monopolistµd Absolute mark-up of industry 1’s domestic firmµe Absolute mark-up of industry 1’s foreign firmµi Absolute mark-up of industry iµˆ Average mark-up of industry 1’s duopolistsν Relative mark-up on the total marginal cost of industry 1’s monopolist oruniform relative mark-upνi Relative mark-up on the total marginal cost of industry iνˆ Average of the relative mark-ups on the total marginal costsνˇ Export threshold of the total–marginal–costs ratio of industry 1’s duopolistspi Profit per firm of industry 1pii Profit per firm of industry iΠi Aggregate profit of industry iσi Elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of good iτ Marginal transport cost of industry 1 unaffected by the schemeτi Marginal transport cost of industry i unaffected by the schemeτj Marginal transport cost of firm j unaffected by the schemeφ Progress of the schemeφˇ Export threshold of the progress of the schemeφ Variable of integration for the progress of the schemeχ Uniform cost–reduction–to–price ratioχi Cost–reduction–to–price ratio of industry iχˆ Average cost–reduction–to–price ratio
Table A.1 Notation
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A.2 Base model3
A.2.1 Direct impact3.3.2
The derivative of (3.16b), with (3.18) for ∆CS and (3.15), with respect to φ is
dDdφ = 12∑i ti
(Xi + X¯i + (φ − φ¯)X ′i)− S′(φ) .
For the reference values, i.e., for φ¯ = φ and X¯i = Xi ∀i, follows D′ (3.17).
A.2.2 Wider impact3.3.3
With I (3.9), y (3.7), S (3.5), D (3.16b), ∆S (3.15) and y = e(p, u), W (3.19) follows as
W = I −D = L+∑i Πi − S(φ)︸ ︷︷ ︸=y
−e(p, u¯)− ∆CS + S(φ)− S(φ¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸=∆S
= L+∑i Πi − e(p, u¯)− ∆CS − S(φ¯)=∑i
(Πi − Π¯i)− (e(p, u¯)− e(p¯, u¯))− ∆CS .
The wider impact is not fully independent of S as the Πi’s and ∆CS depend on the Xi’s,which in turn depend on y (3.7).
A.2.3 Zero profits3.3.5
It follows from (3.23) that
dεi/εidφ > − tipi ⇒ dµi/µidφ = − 1mi
(ti + pi dεi/εidφ
) < 0 (A.1a)
dεi/εidφ > − tiµi ⇒ dpi/pidφ = − 1mi
(ti + µi dεi/εidφ
) < 0 . (A.1b)
A.2.4 Zero direct impact3.3.7
Combining (3.14) with αi = piXi/y and (3.3a) yields∑
i αi pi − µipi X
′iXi = 0 ⇒ ∑i αi µipi X
′iXi =∑i αi X
′iXi .
Hence the step from (3.22c) to (3.22d). Cf. I ′ (3.10b) with pi = αiy/Xi.
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A.3 Monopolistic competition 4
A.3.1 Household 4.1
Because the household consumes equal amounts of all the ni varieties of any good i, theCES sub–utility functions can be reduced to (4.1b):
Xi = Ui(xi) := ( ni∑1 xi
σi−1σi
) σiσi−1 = (nixi σi−1σi ) σiσi−1 = ni σiσi−1 xi . (A.2)
Minimizing the expenditures Pi := nipix˜i subject to the constraint that Ui(x˜i) != 1 with(4.1b) yields x˜i = (piPi
)−σi . (A.3)
This is the amount that the household consumes per variety of good i in order to consumeone unit of the composite i at minimal expenditures. The Marshallian demand functions forsingle varieties (4.2b) are obtained by multiplying x˜i (A.3) by Xi (4.2a). Substituting (A.3)back into the objective function, and solving for Pi, yields (4.3). In deriving the demand fora single variety, and its price elasticity, pi is assumed to have a negligible influence on Pidue to a — supposedly — large ni. See Fujita et al. (1999, sec. 4.1, pp. 46–49).
A.3.2 Long-run equilibrium 4.3
From substituting ni (4.8) together with xi (4.7a) into the sub–utility function (4.1b) follows
Xi = γi (αiy) σiσi−1mi (A.4)with γi := ( σiσi(σi − 1)σi−1 fi
) 11−σi
as a collection of constants. From substituting ni (4.8) and pi (4.5) into (4.3) follows
Pi = 1γi (αiy) 11−σi mi . (A.5)
Because mi and y (4.10) are both nonincreasing in φ, the signs of the dependencies of Xiand Pi on φ are ambiguous. If ti = 0 so that mi is constant, Xi is nonincreasing while Piis nondecreasing in φ. If y is constant, Xi is nondecreasing while Pi is nonincreasing in φ;see section 4.4.
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A.3.3 Welfare4.5
A.3.3.1 Overall impact4.5.1
Substituting the composite quantities (4.2a) into the utility function (4.1a) gives the indirectutility function
u = v (P, y) := (∏i αiαi
) y∏i Piαi (A.6)with P := (P1, . . . , PN ). Substituting the equilibrium price indices (A.5) into (A.6) yields
u = w(m, y) := η yνˆ∏imiαi (A.7a)with νˆ as (4.14) and η :=∏i (αiνiγi)αi ,which is a constant. Rearranging (A.7a) for y gives the corresponding adaptation of theexpenditure function:
f (m, u) := (uη∏i miαi
)1/νˆ . (A.7b)
I take the difference between the equilibrium income (4.10) and the minimal expendituresas given by the expenditure function (A.7b), for the current marginal costs and the referenceutility level which is in turn given by the indirect utility function (A.7a):
I = y− f (m, u¯) = y−( u¯η∏i miαi
)1/νˆ
= y− f (m, w(m¯, y¯)) = y−(1η
(η y¯νˆ∏i m¯αii
)∏
i miαi
)1/νˆ
= δL− f (m, w(m¯, δ¯L)) = [δ − δ¯∏i
(mim¯i
)αi/νˆ] L .
The marginal overall impact with any reference situation, see I (4.13), is
dIdφ = δˆν
∑i αiχiνi
 δ¯δ∏j
(mjm¯j
)αj /νˆ+ νˆ dδ/δdφ
 L . (A.8)
For δ¯ = δ and m¯ = m follows I ′ (4.15).
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A.3.3.2 Direct impact 4.5.2
In the case of a free scheme (4.12a), ∆S = 0, and in the case of a subsidy (4.12b),
∆S =∑i ti (φnixi − φ¯n¯ix¯i) =
[∑
i αiχi
(φδ − φ¯δ¯ mim¯i
)] L .
See (4.16).The derivative of (4.16) and (4.9) is
d∆Sdφ = S′(φ) = dS(φ)dφ = − dδdφ L
since S = L− y = (1− δ) L; see (4.10). With (4.12a), dδ = 0, and with (4.12b),
dδ/δdφ = −δ∑i αiχi m˜imi . (A.9)
The derivative of (4.17a) is
d∆CSdφ =∑i tinixi = δχˆL .
In the case of (4.12a), (4.18) is D′ = δχˆL. In the case of (4.12b), the marginal direct impactat φ = 0 is zero as S′(0) = χˆL = d∆CS/dφ|φ=0. From (4.18) follows
D′ = δ [χˆ − δ∑i αiχi m˜imi
] L ⇒ D′∣∣φ=0 = 0 .
Compare section 3.3.7.Using the rule of a half (Button, 2009, sec. 6, pp. 71–73) instead of (4.17a) yields
∆CS = (φ − φ¯)∑i ti nixi + n¯ix¯i2 = φ − φ¯2
[∑
i αiχi
(δ + δ¯ mim¯i
)] L . (A.10)
Differentiating D, (4.17b) with (A.10), with respect to φ gives
dDdφ = δ
[χˆ + dδ/δdφ − 12∑i αiχi
(1− δ¯δ mim¯i − (φ − φ¯)
(νiχi + dδ/δdφ
))] L .
For any reference situation, i.e., for φ¯ = φ, δ¯ = δ and m¯i = mi ∀i, follows D′ (4.18).
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A.3.3.3 Wider impact4.5.3
The wider impact with I (4.13), y = L− S(φ) = f (m, u) (A.7b), D (4.17b) and ∆S (4.16) is
W = I −D = L− S(φ)︸ ︷︷ ︸=y −f (m, u¯)− ∆CS + S(φ)− S(φ¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸=∆S= L− f (m, u¯)− ∆CS − S(φ¯)= − (f (m, u¯)− f (m¯, u¯))− ∆CS .
(A.11)
The marginal wider impact with any reference situation follows from dI/dφ (A.8) anddD/dφ (4.18), or from W (A.11), i.e., if (4.17a) is applied, as
dWdφ = δˆν
∑i αiχi
νi δ¯δ∏j
(mjm¯j
)αj /νˆ − νˆ L .
For δ¯ = δ and m¯ = m follows W ′ (4.19).
A.4 Monopoly5
A.4.1 Overall impact5.4.1
The indirect utility function follows from substituting the demand functions (5.6) into theutility function (5.4):
u = v (p, y) := u(X (p), z(p, y)) = s(X (p))− pX (p) + y . (A.12a)
Substituting y (5.8) into this yields w(p) (5.11). The corresponding expenditure function is
e(p, u) := u− s(X (p)) + pX (p) . (A.12b)
A.4.2 Direct impact5.4.2
The approximation of (5.16a) by use of the rule of a half (Button, 2009, sec. 6, pp. 71–73) is
∆CS = (φ − φ¯) t X + X¯2 .
The corresponding marginal direct impact, see (5.16b), is
dDdφ = t2
(X (p) + X (p¯) + (φ − φ¯)X ′(p) dpdφ
)− S′(φ) .
For the reference values, i.e., for φ¯ = φ and p¯ = p, follows D′ (5.17).
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A.4.3 Wider impact 5.4.3
The wider impact with I (5.13), D (5.16b), e(p, u) (A.12b) and pi (5.1) is
W = I −D = u− u¯− ∆CS + ∆S= s(X (p))− s(X (p¯))− (mX (p)− m¯ X (p¯))− ∆CS= pi − p¯i − (e(p, u¯)− e(p¯, u¯))− ∆CS . (A.13)
The price is decreasing in the progress of the scheme if there is a sufficiently moderatedecrease, or even increase, in the elasticity as
dε/εdφ > − tp ⇒ dµ/µdφ = − 1m
(t + p dε/εdφ
) < 0
dε/εdφ > − tµ ⇒ dp/pdφ = − 1m
(t + µ dε/εdφ
) < 0 .
A.5 Reciprocal dumping 6
A.5.1 Simultaneous moves 6.3
A.5.1.1 Overall impact 6.3.1
The marginal impacts on p (6.8a) and λ (6.8b) are
dp/pdφ =

− 1md
(td + µd dε/εdφ
) for φ < φˇ
− 1md +me
(td + te + pε dε/εdφ
) for φˇ < φ ∨ φˇ = 0 (A.14a)
dλdφ =

0 for φ < φˇte − tdmd +me
( εp (c + τ)− (1− φ) dεdφ
) for φˇ < φ ∨ φˇ = 0 . (A.14b)
For instance, if demand is isoelastic, there is a decline in the price that is accelerated atthe export threshold. If and only if (dε/ε)/dφ < ((1− φ)p/ (c + τ))−1, the export share isincreasing at a progress of the scheme beyond the export threshold. With either linear orisoelastic demand, i.e., with an elasticity that is either decreasing in φ or constant, thisinequality holds as the right-hand side is positive.
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A.5.1.2 Direct impact6.3.2
The approximate change in the consumer surplus on the market for transportation (6.13a),when applying the rule of a half (Button, 2009, sec. 6, pp. 71–73), is
∆CS = (φ − φ¯) tˆX + ¯ˆtX¯2 .
The corresponding marginal impact on D (6.13b) is
dDdφ = 12
[tˆX + ¯ˆtX¯ + (φ − φ¯)(tˆ X ′(p) dpdφ + (te − td)X dλdφ
)]− S′(φ) .
At the reference values, i.e., at φ¯ = φ, ¯ˆt = tˆ and X¯ = X , this is D′ (6.14).
A.5.1.3 Wider impact6.3.3
The wider impact with I (6.10), D (6.13b), e(p, u) (A.12b) and pi (6.1) is
W = I −D = u− u¯− ∆CS + ∆S= s(X (p))− s(X (p¯))− (mˆ X (p)− ¯ˆmX (p¯))− ∆CS
= pi − p¯i − (e(p, u¯)− e(p¯, u¯))− ∆CS .
(A.15)
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Agglomeration II
B.1 Notation
Symbol MeaningA Quantity of the agricultural good produced per region under symmetryAr Quantity of the agricultural good produced in region rbr Quantity of land employed by agriculture in region rBr Endowment with land and land supply of region rF Quantity of labor employed as fixed input by any industrial firmi Superscript for industrial firms/varietieslA Quantity of agricultural labor per region under symmetrylM Quantity of industrial labor per region under symmetrylˆA Relative change in lAr under symmetrylˆM Relative change in lMr under symmetrylAr Quantity of agricultural labor in region rlMr Quantity of industrial labor in region rlˇAr Quantity of agricultural labor in region r under full concentrationlˇMr Quantity of industrial labor in region r under full concentrationL Endowment with labor and labor supply of the economym Quantity of labor employed as marginal input by industrial firmsMRTSlb Marginal rate of technical substitution of agricultural labor for landn Number of industrial firms/varieties per region under symmetrynr Number of industrial firms in region r and number of varieties produced in rpr Mill price of any industrial variety produced in region rpir Consumer price of industrial variety i in region rPA Price of the agricultural goodPM Consumer price of the industrial composite under symmetryPˆM Relative change in PMr under symmetry
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Symbol MeaningPMr Consumer price of the industrial composite in region rPˇMr Consumer price of the industrial composite in r under full concentrationq Quantity produced per industrial firm/varietyr Subscript for regionsR Rent under symmetryRr Rent in region rRˇr Rent in region r under full concentrations Subscript for the region other than rur Utility of a household in region rUM (·) Lower–tier utility function for the industrial compositew Wage rate under symmetrywˆ Relative change in wr under symmetrywr Wage rate in region rwˇr Wage rate in region r under full concentrationwA Agricultural wage rate under symmetrywM Industrial wage rate under symmetrywAr Agricultural wage rate in region rwMr Industrial wage rate in region rwˇMr Industrial wage rate in region r under full concentrationxr Vector of all varieties’ quantities consumed by a household in region rx˜r Vector of all varieties’ quantities per unit of the composite consumed in rxir Quantity of variety i consumed by a household in region rx˜ir Quantity of variety i per unit of the composite consumed in region rXAr Quantity of the agricultural good consumed by a household in region rXMr Quantity of the industrial composite consumed by a household in region ry Nominal individual income under symmetryyr Nominal individual income in region ryˇr Nominal individual income in region r under full concentrationyAr Nominal individual income in agriculture of region ryMr Nominal individual income in manufacturing of region ryˇMr Nominal individual income in manufacturing of r under full concentrationY Aggregate nominal income per region under symmetryYˆ Relative change in Yr under symmetryYr Aggregate nominal income of region rYˇr Aggregate nominal income of region r under full concentrationZ Trade closedness
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Symbol MeaningZb Value of Z at the break pointγ Agricultural labor per unit of land/output with Leontief technologyδ Earned income’s share of total nominal income under symmetryη Cost share of labor in agriculture with Cobb–Douglas technologyθ Welfare under full concentration relative to industrial welfare in peripheryθb Value of θ at the break pointκ Elasticity of substitution between agricultural labor and landλˆ Relative change in λr under symmetryλr Labor share in region rλˇr Labor share in region r under full concentrationµ Expenditure share for manufacturesσ Elasticity of substitution of the households between any industrial varietiesσbu Threshold of σ that yields a zero wider impactσnbh Maximum value of σ for the no–black–hole condition not to be fulfilledτ Iceberg parameter for interregional trade in manufacturesτb Value of τ at the break pointτbu Threshold of τ that yields a zero wider impactτR Minimum of τ for a zero rent in the periphery under full concentrationτs, τ ′s Value of τ at the sustain point and at its reversal pointτu, τ ′u Value of τ at the utility switch and at its reversal pointτλ Minimum of τ for a zero labor share in the periphery under full concentrationφ Trade freenessφb Value of φ at the break pointχ Welfare under full concentration relative to welfare under symmetryχb Value of χ at the break pointψ Collection of constantsω Welfare under symmetryωˆ Relative change in ωr under symmetryωˇ Welfare under full concentrationωr Welfare in region rωˇr Welfare in region r under full concentrationωAr Agricultural welfare in region rωMr Industrial welfare in region rωˇAr Agricultural welfare in region r under full concentrationωˇMr Industrial welfare in region r under full concentration
Table B.1 Notation
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B.2 Base model7
B.2.1 Preferences7.1
The lower–tier Marshallian demand functions (7.2c) follow from minimizing PMr :=∑i pir x˜irsubject to UM (x˜r) = 1 as given by (7.1b), with x˜r being the vector of all x˜ir ’s, and these in turnbeing the amounts of the single varieties that are consumed per unit of the conposite so thatthe expenditures per unit of the composite are minimal. First, this yields x˜ir = (pir/PMr )−σ .The lower–tier demand functions are calculated as xir = x˜irXMr with XMr as given by (7.2a).The expression for the manufactures’ price index as a CES function of the varieties’ prices(7.3) follows from rearranging PMr =∑i pir x˜ir =∑i (pir)1−σ (PMr )σ for PMr . See Fujita et al.(1999, sec. 4.1, pp. 46–49).
B.2.2 Manufacturing7.2.2
The wage equation for the manufacturing industry (7.10c) is derived by setting supply equalto demand for a single variety of the manufactures. In order to cope with the iceberg cost,this is done in value terms. The supply by any one firm in region r is prq, and the demandby a ssingle household for any variety i is given by (7.2c) multiplied by pir . While thevariety i is produced in only one region, say, in region r, it is consumed in both r and s.Since consumers in r are faced with the mill price pr and consumers in s with the price τpr ,and since the consumers’ preferences are homothetic, total demand for this variety from r is(pr/PMr )1−σ µYr + (τpr/PMs )1−σ µYs. Individual income is simply replaced by total incomedue to the homotheticity, and µYr represents a region’s total expenditure on manufactures,as one can infer from (7.2a). Setting supply equal to demand, and substituting into it themill price (7.6) as well as the quantity produced (7.7), this equation can be rearranged forthe wage rate to yield
wMr = σ − 1σm
( µm(σ − 1)F
)1/σ (Yr (PMr )σ−1 + φYs (PMs )σ−1)1/σ .
By choice of units, i.e., m := (σ − 1) /σ and F := µ/σ , this expression is reduced to (7.10c)as it loses its constant factor.Taking the reverse perspective, i.e., that of a consumer in region r having to pay pr for anydomestically produced variety and τps for any imported variety, the M–composite’s pricegiven by (7.3) can be written as
PMr = (nrpr1−σ + ns (τps)1−σ) 11−σ .
Substituting the numbers of firms (7.8) and the mill prices (7.6) into this, and factorizing
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the constants, one gets
PMr = σmσ − 1 (σF ) 1σ−1
(lMr (wMr )1−σ + φlMs (wMs )1−σ) 11−σ .
By choice of units, as stated above, this becomes (7.10d).
B.2.3 General equilibrium 7.4
Section 7.4 outlines the systems of equations that are summarized as follows. To solve for ashort-run equilibrium, i.e., a general equilibrium with intraregional mobility but interregionalimmobility, one selects values for λr and the parameters. The numerical solution followsfrom (7.10), which is
Rr = (1− η)(η (lAr /γ) κ−1κ + (1− η)) 1κ−1 (B.1a)
wAr = ηγ
(η + (1− η)(lAr /γ) 1−κκ ) 1κ−1 (B.1b)
wMr = (Yr (PMr )σ−1 + φYs (PMs )σ−1)1/σ (B.1c)
wr = max{wAr , wMr } (B.1d)
yr = Rr + Rs2 + wr (B.1e)Yr = λr2yr (B.1f)
PMr = µ 1σ−1 (lMr (wMr )1−σ + φlMs (wMs )1−σ) 11−σ (B.1g)
plus
λr + λs = 1 (B.1h)
λr = lAr + lMr2 (B.1i)max{(wMr − wAr ) lAr , (wAr − wMr ) lMr } = 0 . (B.1j)
All but (B.1h) are to be included for both r ∈ {1, 2}.To solve for a long-run equilibrium, i.e., a general equilibrium with full mobility, I let thelabor distribution be endogenous and append
ωr = yr (PMr )−µ (B.2a)max {(ωs − ωr) λr , (ωr − ωs) λs} = 0 (B.2b)
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to (B.1) in order to produce the long-run system of equations (B.1–2). When attempting tofind a numerical solution, one should be aware that there always is at least one long-runequilibrium because dispersion always is a long-run equilibrium.
B.2.3.1 Dispersion7.4.1
Applying de l’Hôpital’s rule (Abramowitz & Stegun, 1965, p. 13) to the A-sector wage (7.19c)yields limκ→1 ln(w) = limκ→1 (ln(ηγ
)− dδ/dκδ − µ
) .
From the total differentials of (7.17–18a) follows
limκ→1 dδdκ = (1− δ) (δ − µ)1− µ · ln
(δ − µγδ
) .
With δ (8.4), these yield the wage for κ = 1 as given by (7.19c).Merging (7.21c–e) results in
(σ/Z − δ − Z (σ − 1)) wˆ = λˆ− Z lˆM .
With (7.21a–b) and (7.18), and ψ (7.24), this yields
wˆˆλ = 1− δZ/µσ/Z − δ − ψZ (σ − 1) . (B.3)
From (7.22) with (7.21e), (7.21a–b), (7.18), (7.24) and (B.3) follows (7.23).Using (7.23) to solve ωˆ/λˆ != 0 for trade closedness, one solution is Z = 0⇔ τ = 1. Theother is the trade closedness at the break point:
Z = Zb := 2σ − 1(ψµ/δ + δ/µ) (σ − 1) + δ . (B.4)
The corresponding trade freeness is
φb := (ψµ/δ + δ/µ) (σ − 1) + δ − (2σ − 1)(ψµ/δ + δ/µ) (σ − 1) + δ + (2σ − 1) (B.5)
as φ = (1− Z ) / (1 + Z ). The break point in terms of the iceberg factor (7.27) is derivedfrom (B.5) with τ = φ1/(1−σ ). The no–black–hole condition, which is the condition for (B.4–5)and (7.27) to be valid solutions, i.e., for Zb > 0⇔ φb < 1⇔ τb > 1, is that (7.26) must benegative; see (8.6) and (9.6), respectively, for corresponding minimum values of σ for eitherof the two distinct cases.
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B.2.3.2 Subcritical vs. supercritical pitchfork bifurcation 7.4.3
The transition from dispersion to full concentration is either subcritical, like in figure 7.3,or supercritical, like in figure B.1; see Pflüger (2004), Pflüger & Südekum (2008a, 2011),Fujita et al. (1999, appx. to ch. 3) and Grandmont (1988). It is subcritical if the curve atand around τ = τb and λr = 0.5 depicting the partially concentrated long-run equilibriais bent to the right. When the transport cost falls below τb, dispersion turns unstable andthe economy leaps from dispersion to full concentration. If the curve is bent to the left, theeconomy gradually transitions into partial concentration before leaping to full concentration,i.e., the transition is supercritical.
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Figure B.1 Long-run equilibria with a supercritical transition (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 4.53)
Figure B.2 illustrates the short-run equilibria at τ = τb. This indicates the supercriticaltransition as the welfare difference is nonincreasing in the labor share at and around thesymmetric equilibrium, which is thus stable. I.e., the third derivative of the welfare level withrespect to the labor share at λr = 0.5 and τ = τb is negative. The first derivative (7.23) is— by definition — zero at the break point. The second derivative is zero because symmetryis a saddle point. The third derivative is negative. If the third derivative is positive, as infigure 7.5, the transition is subcritical, and the welfare difference is nondecreasing at andaround the symmetric equilibrium, which is thus unstable.If the transition is supercritical, there exists a stable long-run equilibrium with onlypartial concentration within some interval of the transport cost below the break point, as infigure B.3. If the transport cost is below the sustain point, there also exists an unstable long-run equilibrium with partial (but stronger) concentration and a stable fully concentratedlong-run equilibrium. In case of a subcritical transition, the fully concentrated long-runequilibrium is the only stable one at a transport cost below the break point; see figure 7.4.
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Figure B.2 Short-run equilibria at the break point with stable dispersion (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1,µ = 0.4, σ = 4.53, τ = τb ≈ 7.86)
PSfrag replacements
Labor distribution (λr)
Welfa
rediff
erenc
e
unstablestable
Long-run equilibriaω
Mr − ωMsωAr − ωAs
0 0.5 1-0.01
0
0.01
Figure B.3 Short-run equilibria with stable partial concentration (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 4.53, τ = 5.75)
The transition is supercritical if σ is only slightly larger than σnbh, i.e., if τb is eitherhigher than or slightly lower than τs. Since the transport cost thresholds are decreasingin σ , they are quite high when the transition is supercritical. Thus, they are likely to beabove τ so that the economy is agglomerated and a transition does not occur, rendering theanalysis of the wider impact moot. Also, the thresholds — and thus the very occurrence ofa supercritical transition — are sensitive to changes in the parameters. The assessment ofthe wider impact is based on the comparison of the welfare levels at the break point underdispersion and full concentration. If the transition from dispersion to full concentration isnot subcritical, this assessment is not applicable. This is the justification for my disregardof a supercritical transition given in section 7.4.3.
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B.3 Cobb–Douglas case 8
B.3.1 General equilibrium 8.2
Integrating (7.10) or (B.1) with (8.3) yields
lMr = λr2− ( ηwr
) 11−η
wMr = (Yr (PMr )σ−1 + φYs (PMs )σ−1)1/σ
yr = 1− η2
(( ηwr
) η1−η + ( ηws
) η1−η)+ wr
Yr = λr2yr
PMr = µ 1σ−1 (lMr (wMr )1−σ + φlMs (wMs )1−σ) 11−σ
and
λr + λs = 1max{wMr − wr , (wr − wMr ) lMr } = 0 .
B.3.1.1 Dispersion 8.2.1
The equilibrium values follow from substituting δ (8.4) into (7.18–20):
lA = η (1− µ)µ + η (1− µ)lM = µµ + η (1− µ)
R = (1− η)( η (1− µ)µ + η (1− µ)
)η
w = η( η (1− µ)µ + η (1− µ)
)η−1
y = Y = 11− µ
( η (1− µ)µ + η (1− µ)
)η
PM = η( η (1− µ)µ + η (1− µ)
)η−1(µ + η (1− µ)1 + φ
) 1σ−1
ω = η−µ1− µ
( η (1− µ)µ + η (1− µ)
)µ+η(1−µ)( 1 + φµ + η (1− µ)
) µσ−1 .
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B.3.2 Wider impact8.3
A transport cost reduction has an impact on welfare that possibly includes a wider impactat the instant of the cost passing the break point. Table 8.1 lists the following examples.Figure B.4 depicts a negative wider impact, figure B.5 depicts a zero wider impact, andfigure B.6 depicts a positive wider impact. The black dashed lines are the welfare levelsunder symmetry, and the gray solid lines are the welfare levels under full concentration.The black solid lines mark the welfare levels in the states that the economy is in, providedthat there is a decreasing transport cost. One can see that, as the transport cost decreases,it eventually passes the break point, τb, making the economy transition from dispersionto full concentration. As it does, welfare might leap to a higher or lower level. A droprepresents a negative wider impact, and a rise represents a positive wider impact.PSfrag replacements
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Figure B.4 Welfare development with a negative wider impact (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 5)PSfrag replacements
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Figure B.5 Welfare development with a zero wider impact (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = σbu ≈ 5.41)
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Figure B.6 Welfare development with a positive wider impact (γ = 1, η = 0.7, κ = 1, µ = 0.4,σ = 8)
B.4 Limitational case 9
B.4.1 General equilibrium 9.2
B.4.1.1 Dispersion 9.2.1
If the equilibrium is D1, i.e., if γ + µ ≤ 1⇒ δ ≡ µ/ (1− γ) (9.3a), (7.18–19) yield
lA = γlM = 1− γ
R = 1− γ − µ(1− γ) (1− µ)w = µ(1− γ) (1− µ)y = Y = 11− µ
PM = 11− µ
(( µ1− γ
)σ 11 + φ
) 1σ−1 .
If it is D2, i.e., if γ + µ ≥ 1⇒ δ ≡ 1 (9.3b), the equilibrium values are
lA = 1− µlM = µR = 0
w = y = Y = 1γ
PM = 1γ
( 11 + φ
) 1σ−1 .
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With D1, i.e., with (9.3a) and (9.5a), (B.3) and (7.23) are
wˆˆλ = 1− Z/ (1− γ)σ/Z − δ − Z (σ − 1)ωˆˆλ = (δ − µZ ) (1− Z/ (1− γ))σ/Z − δ − Z (σ − 1) + δZσ − 1 .
The intermediate steps of calculating τb (9.7) from ωˆ/λˆ = 0 are
Zb = 2σ − 1(1− γ + 1/ (1− γ)) (σ − 1) + δ
φb = γ2 (σ − 1)− (1− γ − µ)(1 + (1− γ) (3− γ)) (σ − 1) + 1− γ + µ ;
cf. (B.4–5).
B.4.1.2 Concentration9.2.2
The equilibrium values of the fully concentrated long-run equilibrium follow from (9.8–9)with (7.9b), (7.10e) and (7.11b–d). In C1, i.e., if γ + µ ≤ 1 and τ ∈ [1, τR ] (9.10a), they are
λˇ1 = 2− γ2λˇ2 = γ2lˇA1 = lˇA2 = γlˇM1 = 2 (1− γ)Rˇ1 = 1− γ − µ(1− γ) (1− µ)Rˇ2 = 2− γ ((1− γ + µ) / (1− γ − µ)) (τµ − 1)2 + γ (τµ − 1) 1− γ − µ(1− γ) (1− µ)wˇ1 = µ(1− γ) (1− µ)wˇ2 = 2 + (γ + 2 (1− γ) /µ) (τµ − 1)2 + γ (τµ − 1) µ(1− γ) (1− µ)
wˇM2 = ( (2− γ) τ1−σ + γτµ+σ−12 + γ (τµ − 1)
)1/σ µ(1− γ) (1− µ)yˇ1 = 22 + γ (τµ − 1) 11− µyˇ2 = 2τµ2 + γ (τµ − 1) 11− µ
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yˇM2 = 22 + γ (τµ − 1) 11− µ
· [1− µ 2 + γ (τµ − 1)2 (1− γ)
(1− ( (2− γ) τ1−σ + γτµ+σ−12 + γ (τµ − 1)
)1/σ)]
Yˇ1 = 2− γ2 + γ (τµ − 1) 21− µYˇ2 = γτµ2 + γ (τµ − 1) 21− µ
PˇM1 = 21− µ
( µ2 (1− γ)
) σσ−1
PˇM2 = 2τ1− µ
( µ2 (1− γ)
) σσ−1 .
In C2, i.e., if γ/2 + µ ≤ 1 and τ ∈ [τR , τλ] (9.10), or τ ∈ [1, τλ] if also γ + µ ≥ 1, they are
λˇ1 = (2µ 2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1)2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1) + γ
) 12λˇ2 = 4 (1− µ)− γ (2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1))2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1) 12lˇA1 = γlˇA2 = 4 (1− µ)− γ (2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1))2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1)lˇM1 = 2µ 2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1)2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1)Rˇ1 = 2 (τµ − 1)2τµ − γ (τµ − 1)Rˇ2 = 0
wˇ1 = 2− γ (τµ − 1)2τµ − γ (τµ − 1) 1γwˇ2 = 1γ
wˇM2 = [ (2− γ (τµ − 1))σ−1(2τµ − γ (τµ − 1))σ+1
(τ1−σ (2 (2µ + γ) + (4µ − γ2) (τµ − 1))
+ τµ+σ−1 (4 (1− µ)− γ (2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1))))]1/σ 1γyˇ1 = 22τµ − γ (τµ − 1) 1γyˇ2 = 2τµ2τµ − γ (τµ − 1) 1γ
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yˇM2 = 22τµ − γ (τµ − 1) 1γ
· 12
[[ (2− γ (τµ − 1))σ−12τµ − γ (τµ − 1)
(τ1−σ (2 (2µ + γ) + (4µ − γ2) (τµ − 1))
+ τµ+σ−1 (4 (1− µ)− γ (2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1))))]1/σ + γ (τµ − 1)]
Yˇ1 = 2 (2µ + γ) + (4µ − γ2) (τµ − 1)2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1) 22τµ − γ (τµ − 1) 1γYˇ2 = 4 (1− µ)− γ (2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1))2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1) 2τµ2τµ − γ (τµ − 1) 1γ
PˇM1 = 2γ 2− γ (τµ − 1)2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1)
(12 2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1)2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1)
) σσ−1
PˇM2 = 2τγ 2− γ (τµ − 1)2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1)
(12 2 + (2µ − γ) (τµ − 1)2 + (2− γ) (τµ − 1)
) σσ−1 .
In C3, i.e., if γ/2 + µ ≤ 1 and τ ∈ [τλ,∞) (9.10b), they are
λˇ1 = 1λˇ2 = 0lˇA1 = γlˇA2 = 0lˇM1 = 2− γRˇ1 = 2 (1− µ)− γ(2− γ) (1− µ)Rˇ2 = 0wˇ1 = µ(2− γ) (1− µ)wˇ2 = 1γ
wˇM2 = µφ1/σ(2− γ) (1− µ)yˇ1 = 12 (1− µ)
yˇ2 = 4 (1− µ)− γ22γ (2− γ) (1− µ)
yˇM2 = 2− γ − 2µ (1− φ1/σ)2 (2− γ) (1− µ)Yˇ1 = 11− µYˇ2 = 0
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PˇM1 = 11− µ
( µ2− γ
) σσ−1
PˇM2 = τ1− µ
( µ2− γ
) σσ−1 .
In C4, i.e., if γ/2 + µ ≥ 1, they are
λˇ1 = 1λˇ2 = 0lˇA1 = 2 (1− µ)lˇA2 = 0lˇM1 = 2µRˇ1 = Rˇ2 = 0
wˇ1 = wˇ2 = yˇ1 = yˇ2 = 1γwˇM2 = yˇM2 = 1γ φ1/σYˇ1 = 2γYˇ2 = 0
PˇM1 = 1γ 2 11−σPˇM2 = τγ 2 11−σ .
It follows from (9.12) that
dθdτ
∣∣∣∣τ=1 =

µ (2σ − 1)σ for γ + µ ≤ 1 C1µ (2σ − 1)− (1− γ − µ) (σ − 1)σ for γ + µ ≥ 1 ∧ γ/2 + µ ≤ 1 C2µ + σ − 1σ for γ/2 + µ ≥ 1 C4 ,which is positive.
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B.4.1.3 Dispersion vs. concentration9.2.3
It follows from (9.13) that
dχdτ
∣∣∣∣τ=1 =

µ (1− γ)2 for γ + µ < 1 D1 C1µ(µ(1 + 1− µσ − 1
)− 1− γ2
) for γ + µ ≥ 1 ∧ γ/2 + µ < 1 D2 C2µ2 for γ/2 + µ ≥ 1 D2 C4 ,which is positive. Besides,
limτ→∞χ =

12
(2− γ1− γ
) µσσ−1 for γ + µ ≤ 1 D1 C3
12
( γ1− µ
)1−µ (2− γµ
) µσσ−1 for γ + µ ≥ 1 ∧ γ/2 + µ ≤ 1 D2 C3
2 µσ−1 > 1 for γ/2 + µ ≥ 1 D2 C4 ,
which can be either less than one or greater than one if γ/2 + µ ≤ 1.
End of Appendices 
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